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Edsel Murphy is the only philosopher ever to have metaphysically 
accounted for the occurrence of bankruptcies. Admittedly, his famous 
First Law1 is nonspecific. It covers all of life's misunderstandings, 
misfortunes and failures. Murphian thinkers have nevertheless always 
recognized that bankruptcies were among the distinct disasters Mur-
phy had implicitly predicted and explained. Ironically, no lawyer, 
judge, or scholar of bankruptcy law has ever made that same short 
deductive leap. 
Murphy taught that if we fail to understand failure, we fail to un-
derstand. Our profession has ignored his teaching and fallen into that 
trap. Bankruptcy scholars lack any systematic theory which explains 
the behavior of people in trouble. (Indeed, given our disregard of 
Murphian philosophy, it is doubtful whether the development of such 
a theory could ever have been possible.) We don't even have any em-
pirical information about how failing debtors behave. 
All we do know is that baajcruptcy is not working as a creditors' 
remedy. General creditors don't get paid by bankrupts.2 Murphy's 
1. Murphy's Law is so well known that it seems pedantic to footnote its content. Neverthe· 
less, the Law itself suggests that if it is important for a person to know it, that person might not. 
I will, therefore, restate it here. Murphy's Law (in its weaker formulation) holds that Whate••er 
can go wrong, will A stronger version has been derived from Sullivan's Co-Proposition which 
states that "Murphy was an optimist." This has been taken to mean, when restated in rigorous 
form, that the basic law is subject to the condition that Nearly everything can go wrong yielding 
the so-called strong version of the law which can be simplified as "Nearly everything will go 
wrong." This paper takes no position on whether the weaker or stronger version best reflects 
empirical reality. 
2. See, e.g., Countryman, Code Security Interests in Bankruptcy, 75 CoM. L.J. 269 (1970) 
(concluding, from extensive personal inquiries with bankruptcy practitioners and judges, that 
general creditors don't get paid much by bankrupts). Murphians were generally unsurprised to 
learn this and, on the whole, felt that had Professor Countryman really understood what Murphy 
was saying, he could have saved himself a bundle of work. Others have worked even harder to 
establish that same fact, however. See, e.g., D. STANLEY & M. GIRTH, BANKRUPTCY: PROB· 
' 
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Law foretells that neither theoretical voids nor lack of information will 
inhibit experts from expressing opinions. Predictably, bankruptcy 
scholars assume that the "problem" of zero collections in bankruptcies 
can somehow be cured by clever tinkering with bankruptcy law.3 
This study departs from that tinkering tradition. One of its con-
clusions springs directly from an early corollary of Murphy's Law, 
Seamus O'Reilly's Irrelevance of Repair Rule ("Attempts to fix things 
are not only doomed but also meaningless"). The logic linking Mur-
phy's Law to O'Reilly's Rule is straightforward: if things cannot ever 
be made to perform as they were intended to, it is futile to try to repair 
them. I show below why bankruptcy law can never be made to work 
LEM, PROCESS, REFORM 88, 127, 130 (1971) (reporting that while, in most cases, unsecured 
creditors received nothing, general creditors in personal bankruptcies received an average of 7% 
of their proved and allowed claims; creditors of business bankrupts received an average of 8% ); 
T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN & J. WESTBROOK, As WE FORGIVE OUR DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY 
AND CoNSUMER CREDIT IN AMERICA 199-229 (1989); Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Folklore 
and Facts: A Preliminary Report From the Consumer Bankruptcy Project, 60 AM. BANKR. L.J. 
293 (1986) (reporting the likelihood, based on an extensive empirical study, that consumer bank-
rupts have few distributable assets by the time they are in bankruptcy);' Buckley, The Bankruptcy 
Priority Puzzle, 72 VA. L. REv. 1393, 1411 (1986) (reporting on a similar 1968 Canadian study 
showing the average unsecured creditor in a Canadian bankruptcy recovered less than 6%); Her-
bert & Pacitti, Down and Out in Richmond, Virginia: The Distribution of Assets in Chapter 7 
Bankruptcy Proceedings Closed During 1984-87, 22 U. RICH. L. REv. 303, 311 (1988) (reporting 
that nothing is distributed to creditors in 96% of all cases studied); LoPucki, The Debtor in Full 
Control - Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Parts 1 & 2, 51 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 99, 247 (1983) (reporting similar results from a study of Chapter 11 filings in one 
district). 
3. See, e.g., LoPucki, A General Theory of the Dynamics of the State Remedies/Bankruptcy 
System, 1982 WIS. L. REv. 311, 363-65 (assuming that if bankruptcies occurred sooner, creditors 
would get paid more, and proposing that bounties be paid to creditors to encourage them to 
initiate early proceedings). Since most bankruptcies are consumer bankruptcies and, therefore, 
most of the unpaid creditors in bankruptcies are creditors of consumers, a lot of the heat has 
focused on proposals to deny discharges to consumer debtors by various revisions of the current 
law. See Nimmer, Consumer Bankruptcy Abuse, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 89 
for a comprehensive review of this extensive literature. 
Not all writers proposing to modify the Bankruptcy Code (Code) to treat unsecured creditors 
better in bankruptcies specifically rest their arguments on the fact that those creditors now re-
ceive nothing. See, e.g., Carlson, Successor Liability in Bankruptcy: Some Unifying Themes of 
Intertemporal Creditor Priorities Created by Running Covenants, Products Liability, and Toxic-
Waste Cleanup, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1987, at 119 (current creditors could collect 
more if only they could liquidate the debtor's assets free of servitudes); Countryman, The Con-
cept of a Voidable Preference in Bankruptcy, 38 VAND. L. REv. 713, 772-76, 813-16 (1985) (criti-
cizing the exemption from preference attack of payments made in the ordinary course of 
business, and of a similar exemption for small preferences by consumer debtors, because those 
exemptions violate the equal treatment policy); Eisenberg, Bankruptcy Law in Perspective, 28 
UCLA L. REv. 953, 992-97 (1981) (arguing that pre-filing conversions of nonexempt property 
into exempt property ought to be avoidable, for similar reasons). Even so, such proposals implic-
itly assume that the unsecured creditors must not already be receiving favorable enough treat-
ment. Otherwise the recommended tinkering would not be worth fiddling with. Not all the 
proposed tinkering is intended to make the unpaid unsecured creditors better off, of course. See, 
e.g., Baird & Jackson, Corporate Reorganizations and the Treatment of Diverse Ownership Inter-
ests, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 97 (1984) (arguing that existing interpretations of the Code's automatic 
stay provisions tend to disfavor unduly secured creditors). 
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as it is supposed to and can never be fixed.4 It follows that tinkering is 
a waste of time. 
The Murphian argument does not stop there, however. Another 
corollary, O'Shaunessey's Irony, holds "It is good that remedies don't 
succeed." Attempted repairs are often worse than wasteful. They can 
also be retrogressive. Bankruptcy law is itself an attempt to correct 
previous conditions that made unpaid creditors unhappy. If it 
worked, we would all be worse off. I show below that the best bank-
ruptcy estates are the empty ones. The people who don't get paid are 
the very ones who shouldn't get paid. That showing should introduce 
Critical Murphian Studies to the legal community, and, thus, belatedly 
obtain for Murphy the recognition he so richly deserves. 
Part I briefly examines the conventional explanation for bank-
ruptcy's defining characteristic, its default distributional rule.5 It con-
cludes that the conventional explanation is insufficiently informative 
for us to tell whether the Bankruptcy Code (Code)6 is actually work-
ing or not. Part II argues that the only existing systematic attempt to 
explain bankruptcy law, the so-called "Creditors' Bargain" Theory, is 
inadequate for two reasons. First, the predictions it generates are be-
lied by real-world events. Second, it is mistaken on theoretical 
grounds, primarily because it ignores how debtors are likely to manage 
their assets. Part III presents the Murphian theory of failing behavior, 
the hypothesis that the debtors are efficient liquidators of their own 
declining affairs. This Part shows how both solvent and insolvent 
debtors faced with losses can be expected to manage their assets in 
optimal ways without bankruptcy legislation. Part IV summarizes the 
conclusions drawn from elementary Murphian theory and suggests an-
other weakness in the Creditors' Bargain model: it disregards the ben-
4. Although the remainder of this article will break the logic of this deduction into many 
discrete substeps, it also follows directly from Murphy's Law itself. Belaboring the obvious, 
suppose the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code is to achieve state of affairs A. Murphy's law 
predicts (in its weaker form) that if there are contingencies permitting the arrival at the state 
Not-A, Not-A is where things will wind up. The strong version of the law, of course, insists that 
such contingencies always will exist. This Article makes only the weaker claim that they do 
exist, not that they must, although, in candor, the likelihood that they might ever not exist is 
minuscule. The foregoing thought is not original with this writer. O'Rourke's First Legislative 
Corollary formulated in 1913 ("Reality will thwart the intentions of Congressmen, if it is true 
that they had any") said as much. 
5. I speak here of bankruptcy as a creditors' remedy system only. It is true that our bank· 
ruptcy law also provides significant benefits to debtors, most importantly in the form of partial or 
total discharge from debt. So many people closely identify debtor protection with bankruptcy 
that my assertion of the importance of bankruptcy's creditor protection scheme might seem con· 
troversial. In segregating debtor protection from creditors' remedies for purposes of analysis, I 
am only following the conventional distinctions found in other works which will be discussed 
here. See sources cited infra note 18. 
6. 11 u.s.c. §§ 101-1330 (1988). 
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efits of having debtors distribute their own assets. From the existing 
theory, it projects reasons for believing that optimal distributions are 
likely to occur without the intervention of bankruptcy. It ends by 
speculating on why we are tempted to adopt and then tinker with 
bankruptcy law, even in the face of the O'Conner Construct ("You 
can't fine-tune a mess"). 7 
I. THE POVERTY OF PARITY POLICY: WHAT EQUALITY THEORY 
DOESN'T TELL Us 
The first theorem derived from Murphy's Law was developed by 
Murphy himself, and came to be known as Edsel's Edict. It states: 
"The better you think you understand what's going on, the less likely 
it is that you really do." This study begins by showing that bank-
ruptcy scholarship proves the validity of the Edict. 
Classic bankruptcy law, as I will use that term, is a collective credi-
tors' remedy with one defining feature: the procedure provides in ad-
vance just how the proceeds recovered by the collective will be 
distributed among its members. The fundamental policy of bank-
ruptcy law, goes the ritual incantation, is to obtain equal treatment for 
creditors of the same class (at least in "straight" bankruptcies).8 That 
at least, is surely Congress' intent.9 Professor Countryman recently 
documented that intent as he traced the history of preference law. 10 
Suppose the debtor pays one creditor but not another. The provisions 
in the Code that void the preferential payment could have been justi-
fied because Congress disapproved either of the debtor's reasons for 
making payment or of the creditor's for collecting it. Since Congr~s 
7. I am indebted to Stephan Kinsella, LSU Law Center Class of 1991, for leading me to 
O'Conner's observation. 
8. "The theme of the Bankruptcy Act is 'equality of distribution'; and if one claimant is to be 
preferred over others, the purpose should be clear from the statute." Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 
U.S. 25, 29 (1952) (citation omitted); see also 3 J. MOORE & L. KING, COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY 1f 60.01, at 743 (14th ed. 1977); REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS 
OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, at 19 (1973); cf. 
Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. 
REv. 1695, 1780-87 (1985), for an analogous argument that equality is equity in the distribution 
of tender offer proceeds. 
The specific equality required by the Bankruptcy Code is pro rata equality. If the debtor has 
assets of $100 to be distributed, and has only two creditors owed, respectively, $600 and $400, 
the assets will be distributed to the creditors in proportion to the size of their claims or $60 to the 
first creditor and $40 to the second. 
9. See 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (1988). Bruce Johnsen, a fellow follower of Murphy, pointed out 
that in discussing congressional intent I had ignored his own contribution to Murphian thought. 
The Johnsen Judgment opines that any legislator's intent is nearly always to take wealth from 
one pocket and to move it in the most practical but direct fashion into another pocket, preferably 
his own. The text accompanying note 107 infra indicates how the Judgment helps to explain 
§ 726(b). 
10. Countryman, supra note 3, at 714-25. 
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made the motives of both irrelevant when it defined which transfers 
were avoidable, nothing explains why Congress outlawed preferences 
except an intent that the two creditors be treated "equally."11 
The troubling thing about that conclusion is, however, that there 
seems to be no good reason why Congress should care. Professor 
Weisberg has convincingly shown that the morality of equal treatment 
among creditors is and always has been controversial. 12 Congress it-
self has also been ambivalent about strict pro rata equality. Distribu-
tions in reorganizations under Chapters 9, 11, 12, and 13 of the Code 
can be made "unequally." Reorganization plans can sort creditors 
into fluid and differing classes for the purposes of treating them 
differently. 13 
Moreover, if Congress thought bankruptcy law was needed to 
achieve "equality," either its conclusion was superfluous or its reason-
ing morally and logically incoherent. If creditors were in fact "equal," 
there is no reason to believe that they would not be treated accord-
ingly. Imagine a world in which all creditors were clones. Debtors 
would have no reason to prefer one clone over another. If one did 
receive more than another, the difference in treatment would, by defi-
nition, be simply random. Risk-neutral clones would be indifferent as 
between a guarantee of being paid equally with all the other clones, or 
a random chance of being preferred or disfavored in a random 
amount. Over a volume of credit transactions, the outcome would be 
the same. Bad debt would be evenly distributed across the population 
of creditor clones. Bankruptcy law would be unnecessary in order to 
guarantee ultimate "equal" pro rata treatment. Consequently, the 
problem must be that creditors are not in fact "equal" to each other, in 
which case we are left to wonder why Congress wants unequal people 
to be treated equally.14 
11. Id. at 748. 
12. Weisberg, Commercial Morality, The Merchant Character. and the History of the Voida· 
ble Preference, 39 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1986). 
13. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1122, l123(a)(l)-(4), 1222(a)(3)-(b)(2), 1322(a)(3)-(b)(2), § 901(a) 
(1988). The congressional commitment to "equality" is also undercut for the claims of specific 
creditors. Since pro rata distributions are computed using the amount of a creditor's "allowed 
claim" and the claims of certain creditors are not "allowed" in as full measure as are the claims 
of other creditors, the distributional formula does not result in "equal" treatment of the disfa· 
vored claims except in a formal sense. See 11 U.S.C. § 502 (1988). 
14. Risk-averse clones would, of course, prefer guaranteed to random treatment. There are 
at least theoretical reasons for believing that when creditors are firms, they will evaluate credit 
risk from a risk-neutral standpoint. See, e.g., Schwartz, Security Interests and Bankruptcy Priori· 
ties: A Review of Current Theories, 10 J. LEGAL Sruo. 1, 22-24 (1981) (corporate management's 
goal of maximizing the market value of corporate stock implies risk-neutrality). Individuals, of 
course, are assumed to be risk-averse. Pro rata distribution treats individuals and firms the same. 
Another way of framing the mystery in the congressional formula is to ask why Congress would 
want to treat the most risk-averse creditors exactly like the least risk-averse. 
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It is no answer to say that "equal" treatment of different people is 
nevertheless a normative standard worth pursuing for itself. Appeals 
to simple "equality" can not justify the pro rata equality required by 
the Bankruptcy Code. Indeed, most unsecured creditors left in bank-
ruptcies are treated "equally." They all receive zero. Simple "equal-
ity" may justify pro rata distributions, but it also justifies dividing the 
estate per capita, equalizing the percentage of total wealth lost by each 
creditor, and a host of other possible formulae which possess an attri-
bute of formal "equality." Choosing among equality formulae is im-
possible without pointing to normative standards other than 
"equality" itself.15 Consequently, bankruptcy's pro rata formula can-
not be explained by a desire for simple "equality." The formula must 
instead be justified by a wish to foster some other unarticulated under-
lying norm, but we are left in the dark about what that norm is. While 
we remain in the dark, bankruptcy policy is incomprehensible. If, on 
conventional grounds, we do not know why it exists or how it can be 
justified, it is difficult to know whether or not bankruptcy law is work-
ing. It is also difficult to justify any proposals to change it. 
II. POOLS, PRISONERS AND PIES: THE PERILOUS PARABLES OF 
BANKRUPTCY LAW 
Anti-Murphian scholars16 believe there is an underlying normative 
criterion which justifies bankruptcy equality, to wit: wealth max-
imization. They argue that pro rata distribution of debtors' estates 
tends to encourage efficient behavior. Murphian theory implies that 
nonequality is the only distributional standard which is wealth maxi-
mizing, which suggests that those scholars' attempts to justify bank-
ruptcy are misguided. In this Part, I examine their argument. 
No one proposes that all creditors' remedies be collective proceed-
ings.17 Understanding bankruptcy law thus means understanding why 
15. Weston, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1982). 
16. See writers and works cited infra note 18. 
17. For the obvious reason that it would be pointlessly costly to involve Creditors A, B, 4 
... M in what is essentially a disagreement between the debtor and Creditor N. If a collective 
proceeding is relatively easily available, the failure of A, B, 4 ... M to initiate it is evidence that 
they are indifferent about the outcome of the Debtor/N dispute. In this connection, it is interest-
ing to note that only a tiny percentage of all bankruptcy proceedings are commenced involunta-
rily. See, e.g., REPORTS OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL CoNFERENCE OF THE UNITED 
STATES AND ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE 
UNITED STATES COURTS Table x, at 133 (1977) (reporting that only 0.6% of all petitions filed 
from 1968 to 1977 were involuntary cases). If the debtors' estates are empty when the proceed-
ings are voluntarily commenced, however, it is difficult to imagine that creditors could not have 
proved the grounds necessary for the grant of an involuntary petition. 11 U.S.C. § 303(h)(l) 
(1988) provides that the petitioning creditor need merely show that the debtor is generally not 
paying her debts as they become due. 
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and when collective proceedings are appropriate. Anti-Murphians 
have attempted to explain bankruptcy law by likening the insolvent-
debtor/ creditors relationship to a "common pool" or "prisoner's di-
lemma."18 Those metaphors have proved useful in explaining law and 
legal institutions. They illustrate circumstances in which fighting over 
who gets the pieces reduces the size of the pie. Competitive behavior 
of that sort leads to suboptimal allocation of scarce resources by wast-
ing possible pie.19 Law can be economically justified if it induces ac-
tors to replace such situationally destructive competition with more 
efficient cooperative activity. This essay does not challenge the useful-
ness of those heuristics. It does question whether they apply to 
bankruptcy. 
My argument begins by recasting the Anti-Murphian pool, pris-
oner and pie images into an appropriate Murphian form. In Mur-
phian poetics the vulture symbolizes the force which regulates reality. 
Pictures of pools and pies elicit unrealistically pleasurable, possibly op-
timistic images. Even the prisoner metaphor evokes notions that di-
sasters are voluntarily avoidable. Rigorous Murphian analysis 
requires a root of appropriately hopeless hue, which is why the vul-
ture, and not fishing, pastry, or even plea-bargains must constitute our 
starting point. 20 
18. See generally Baird, A World Without Bankruptcy, LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS., Spring 
1987, at 173, 183-84; T. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 28-31 (1986); 
Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725 (1985); D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, 
CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 31-35 (1985) (arguing that the debtor/ 
multiple creditor relationship, functioning in a regime of state "grab-law" creditors' remedies, 
creates perverse incentives leading to a common pool problem in which each creditor in serving 
his own self-interest gains less from his actions than he might harm the other creditors and that 
creditors would, therefore, in the absence of information, agree to pro rata sharing to preserve 
the benefits of collective action in liquidating and paying out the debtor's estate); R. EPSTEIN, 
TAKINGS 224-28 (1985) (same); Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the 
Creditors' Bargain, 91 YALE L.J. 857 (1982); see also Scott, Through Bankruptcy with the Credi-
tors' Bargain Heuristic, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 691, 700--07 (1986) (suggesting that creditors might 
adopt a loss-sharing formula like the general average in admiralty, which resembles the pro rata 
distribution in bankruptcy, because they are risk-averse, and sometimes the incentives to avoid or 
reduce risks need not be dampened by loss-sharing agreements); Jackson & Scott, On the Nature 
of Bankruptcy: An Essay on Bankruptcy Sharing and The Creditors' Bargain, 15 VA. L. REV. 155 
(1989) (arguing that creditors might agree to pro rata sharing as a form of catastrophe insurance, 
but concluding that the administrative costs of accomplishing such an objective may outweigh 
the insurance benefits). 
As the reader can well imagine, the subject of perverse incentives, the rock on which Jackson, 
Baird, and Scott build their cases, is a subject dear to the hearts ofMurphians. Thus to claim, as 
I will below, that things are not as perverse as they seem may sound like heresy. My defense is 
that once perversity becomes accepted fact, a new and higher state is reached, that of 
metaperversity, in which the perverse thing to think is that things aren't so perverse after all. 
19. See generally R. AxELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF CoOPERATION (1984). 
20. It is worth speculating whether the choice of too-rosy metaphors explains why the Anti· 
Murphian analysts went wrong, but that is beyond the scope of this study. The 14th corollary 
("If things seem to be coming your way, you're in the wrong lane") indicates that might have 
happened. 
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A. The Parable of the Vultures - Reflections on Common Pools 
Once upon a time, a vulture cruised the desert observing critters 
plodding over the sand. It ignored several fat ones. When meaty crit-
ters die, there is enough food for everyone and thus no reason to linger 
and watch them. Eventually, however, the vulture saw a dying critter 
which didn't have enough flesh on its bones to feed the entire flock. 
That discovery led the vulture to begin circling to ensure that when 
death came, it would be first in line to chomp on the carcass. Other 
vultures saw the first one circling. Guessing what was afoot and not 
wishing to miss an impending feast, they too joined the circle. Soon, 
the entire flock was going round and round.21 
Each vulture noted that as other members joined the circling flock, 
prospects of getting a full meal diminished. Skittish vultures became 
overeager22 and were tempted to sneak in and snarf up some sirloin 
21. Cf. T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 16 (arguing that the first-in-time priority system typical 
of nonbankruptcy creditors' remedy systems induces creditors to duplicate the costs of monitor-
ing debtors and to waste resources racing to courthouses to be first in line with claims to the 
debtor's assets). 
22. THE FAR SIDE 
"Julian ... you're cheating." 
Copyright 1987. Universal Press Syndicate. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved. 
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even while there was life left in the failing critter.23 As a result, the 
critter was prematurely dismembered. Many unfed vultures wondered 
whether, had the critter been able to reach a water hole, it might have 
put on enough meat to feed the entire flock. Worse, the carcass was 
not butchered as part of a plan to yield rib-eyes and roasts. Tom up in 
a free-for-all, valuable cuts became chopped meat.24 
The moral of the story is simple: Murphy's Law primes Pareto 
Optimality.25 Nature, in all of its disastrous manifestations, is always 
necessitating interactions which make someone worse off. Despite the 
time and energy vultures spend circling, watching26 to see whether 
other vultures are circling, and disguising their own activity, their diet 
consists of little hamburger and almost no T-Bone. 
The Anti-Murphians, unfortunately, have not been content merely 
to replicate the proof of this essential Murphian insight. They claim 
an ideal bankruptcy-type act could ameliorate the vultures' 
problems.27 The claim that Congress could repeal Murphy's Law is 
transparently preposterous. Only Murphy's Law itself could explain 
why anybody would take such a claim seriously.28 Nevertheless, to 
establish the superiority of the Murphian Model, it will be useful to 
clear the underbrush first. The mistakes of the Anti-Murphians are 
23. Compare Baird, supra note 18, at 183 (in the absence of a collective assessment strategy, 
creditors will rush to claim a debtor's assets regardless of recuperative potential) with A. 
SCHWARTZ & R. Scorr, CoMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 777 (1982) 
(ariullg that under nonbankruptcy law, creditors have perverse incentives to collect too early). 
As Murphy would have predicted, however, there is also significant scholarly opinion that under 
bankruptcy law, the incentive system changes so that creditors end up trying to collect too late. 
See, e.g., T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 205-06; Lopucki, supra note 3. 
24. Cf. T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 14-15 (describing administrative costs, and the waste 
that might occur from piecemeal dismemberment of a debtor's estate under state "grab-law" 
creditors' remedies). 
25. Pareto Optimality (so named for Italian Economist Vilfredo Pareto, its first formulator) 
is a normative welfare criterion used by economists to evaluate varying states of economic affairs. 
A situation is said to be "Pareto Optimal" when it is impossible to effect a change benefiting one 
individual without harming someone else. See, e.g., w. BAUMOL, EcONOMIC THEORY AND OP-
ERATIONS ANALYSIS 561 (4th ed. 1977). For a discussion of the significance of the Pareto crite-
ria and other competing economic welfare measures, see Coleman, Efficiency, Exchange, and 
Auction: Philosophic Aspects of the Economic Approach to Law, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 221 (1980). 
26. See supra note 22. 
27. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 18. 
28. Not everyone does. See, e.g., Countryman, supra note 3, at 823-27; Eisenberg, Commen-
tary on "On the Nature of Bankruptcy": Bankruptcy and Bargaining, 75 VA. L. REv. 205 (1989); 
Nimmer, Negotiated Bankruptcy Reorganization Plans: Absolute Priority and New Value Contri-
butions, 36 EMORY L.J. 1009, 1011 (1987); Roe, Commentary on "On the Nature of Bankruptcy": 
Bankruptcy, Priority, and Economics, 75 VA. L. REv. 219 (1989) (all criticizing the Creditors' 
Bargain metaphor). Although the doubters do not base their disagreements on Murphian 
grounds, the fact that disagreement exists about erroneous ideas has been cited as evidence for 
the proposition that it is the weaker rather than stronger form of Murphy's Law which actually 
prevails in the real world. 
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best exposed by considering the scenario envisioned by their 
prescriptions. 
B. The Fable of Flankruptcy - Cures for the Common Pool 
The vultures realized the flock would prosper if they all agreed to 
schedule the banquet at the optimal moment, butcher the carrion into 
choice cuts and distribute portions equally. Flock members could 
then engage in productive activity (like cruising for new carrion or 
sieeping) instead of spying on each other and circling, and yet eat flank 
steak instead of scraps. Holdout and free-rider problems prevented 
them from agreeing, however. Fortunately, Congress realized the vul-
tures needed to be saved from themselves and enacted an optimal col-
lective scavenging law, adopting the terms that the vultures would 
have bargained for had they been able to agree - a Flankruptcy Act. 
Murphians observed that the carcass was a conspicuous nonparty 
to the Vultures' Bargain.29 Cynics agreed that the Flankruptcy Act 
had been predicted by Mulligan's Mandate for Multi-Party Conflicts 
("Let's you and me agree before the fight to gang up and clean him 
out").30 The Vultures' Bargain proponents implicitly assume that car-
casses do not care if they are ganged up on or not, and assert, "What's 
good for vultures is good for carcasses."31 
Whatever its motivation, The Flankruptcy Act had predictable 
features. There was an automatic "King's-X" on the death of the car-
rion to prevent any vulture from sneaking bites before the others ar-: 
rived. 32 To discourage the overeager from trying to evade the King's-
X rule, premature biters were required to regurgitate any chunks eaten 
pre-mortem. 33 Butchers were appointed to cut up carcasses which, by, 
replacing frenzied ad hoc carving committees, lowered butchering ex-
29. Countryman, supra note 3, at 827 n.603. 
30. The possibility of collusion between any two players in three-party games makes out-
comes of such games unpredictable. See, e.g., H. RAIFFA, THE ART AND SCIENCE OF NEGOTIA-
TION 257-74 (1982). 
31. Cf. T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 13 (asserting that the happiness of debtors can be 
derived from the happiness of creditors: "If the creditors have to protect themselves by means of 
a costly and inefficient system [referring to state creditors' remedies], Debtor is going to have to 
pay more to obtain credit."). It is possible, of course, that debtors would agree to a bankruptcy 
act so long as there were goodies in the act for them as well. See, e.g., Baird, supra note 18, at 
174 (arguing that early English bankruptcy legislation provided a discharge for debtors in order 
to induce them to cooperate with their creditors). This paper does not discuss the discharge 
feature of the current Bankruptcy Code. 
32. Cf. T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 151 (arguing that the purpose of 11 U.S.C. § 362 
(1988) which provides for an automatic stay of all collection activity upon the commencement of 
bankruptcy proceedings is to stop individual creditor activity that might undermine the collective 
enterprise). 
33. Cf. 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1988); T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 125 ("Approached from the 
perspective of the common pool, preference law exists to prevent creditors from trying to change 
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penses. 34 Butchers were charged with distributing the carved carrion 
to members of the flock in equal portions. 35 
Tne fable makes interesting literature. Anti-Murphians, however, 
argue it shows vultures can live happily ever after, a conclusion that 
does not follow. The notion that anybody could live happily ever after 
violates every known Murphian principle. 
If we enact a bankruptcy law it should be engineered to do as little 
damage as is possible. My disagreements with the Anti-Murphians on 
engineering questions only amount to quibbles. 36 The point of the par-
able for the Anti-Murphians, however, is not that bankruptcy could 
and should be made better but that a world with a bankruptcy law is 
better than a world without one. That Murphian theory denies. The 
denial is credible. Vultures' Bargains do not seem to be very 
profitable. 
1. The Factual Flaws of Flankruptcy 
Even within the logic of the parable, a Flankruptcy system has 
costs. Whether we ought to have Flankruptcy is not a question of 
metaphor or theory, but rather of numbers.37 Do the benefits exceed 
the costs? Efficiency, even using a weak measure, is after all poten-
tially an empirical concept. The existing numbers do not suggest the 
ending of the vulture story is a happy one. 38 Although better data 
might discourage .us less, it is difficult to believe that the point of the 
Vultures' Bargain was to adopt a regime in which vultures end up with 
little or nothing. Maybe the failure of the existing mandate for collec-
tive behavior to produce any apparent benefits for the cooperating ac-
tors results from small defects in the present terms of the mandatory 
charter. That is the tinkerer's basic hope. If the Vultures' Bargain 
theory has in fact been largely implemented, but the predicted benefits 
to the vultures do not materialize, it is equally possible that something 
is wrong with the theory. 
The Anti-Murphians acknowledge that replacing an array of indi-
their existing position vis-a-vis other creditors in anticipation of bankruptcy's collective proceed-
ings (or having the debtor do it for them)."). 
34. Cf. 11 U.S.C. §§ 702, 323, 704 (1988). 
35. Cf. T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 30 (explaining that the division of the debtor's estate 
might vary in a real, negotiated creditors' bargain, but that lacking information about the bar-
gaining strengths and skills of all of the involved creditors, pro rata is about the best one could do 
in coming up with a formula for the actual distribution). 
36. See Eisenberg, A Bankruptcy Machine That Would Go of Itself. 39 STAN. L. REV. 1519 
(1987), for someone else's quibbles. 
37. This much, at least, has been recently conceded even by Anti-Murphians. See Jackson & 
Scott, supra note 18, at 203. 
38. For the numbers, see sources cited supra note 2. 
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vidualized remedies with a mandatory collective process imposes costs 
on the community of vultures which result from either the inability or 
failure to engineer perfectly a Flankruptcy system. 39 After passage of 
the Act, the vultures' expectations change as their prospective reme-
dies shift from the old to the new system. Some perceive the new re-
gime to be disadvantageous in some cases, so they expend resources 
trying to keep the flock out of a Flankruptcy proceeding for some car-
casses. Others, for similar opportunistic reasons, may seek to initiate 
proceedings in inappropriate circumstances. Drafting precise rules 
which stop such strategic behavior is difficult. Administering looser 
standards is equally costly, requiring extensive, and therefore expen-
sive, inquiry into motives. 40 
There are other costs of Flankruptcy, however, which the Anti-
Murphians do not explicitly acknowledge. Flankruptcy requires the 
formation of a "firm" with appointment of "management" (a trustee 
vulture or butcher) and conflicts of interest among its "owners." The 
creation of firms can be explained on efficiency grounds when transac-
tion costs of organizing productive activity using market contracts are 
high,41 but conducting business in that form never comes free.42 Ad-
ministering a firm, even one with the narrow mission of scavenging a 
single carcass, spawns agency costs as the management tries to exprq-
priate the gains the owners hoped to obtain by forming the firm, and 
the owners struggle with each other for control. Conflict doesn't go 
away in firms. It merely takes a different form.43 
The inability to engineer an appropriate division of any carcass 
under the collective system imposed serious social costs on the com-
munity of vultures. The Flankruptcy Act regulated only salvaging of 
carcasses that had already been found. It did not coordinate the 
butchering and distributing of dead carcasses with other vulture activ-
ity (like cruising in search of new carrion) which remained un-
regulated, but it affected that behavior nonetheless. In the pre-
Flankruptcy state of nature, there was some greater-than-pro-rata pay-
off to vultures for being strong, swift, or clever. The prospect oflarger 
rewards for finding carrion which might not have to be shared tended 
39. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 3, at 957-58; Jackson & Scott, supra note 18, at 197-202. 
40. Jackson & Scott, supra note 18, at 197-202. 
41. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 EcoNOMICA 386 (1937). 
42. Indeed, the "Ain't no free lunches" rule was one of the earliest Murphian discoveries. 
43. See generally o. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND ANTI-
TRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975). This observation was also one of the early fruits of the Critical 
Murphian Studies Movement. Liam O'Brian, an early Murphian, formulated it in a more precise 
fashion, to wit: "The costs of administration will expand so as to be greater than or equal to the 
value of the estate." 
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to induce the most efficient scavengers to cruise, looking for dying crit-
ters. The pro rata outcome under Flankruptcy, which promised the 
weak and lazy vultures a free ride from the activity of their stronger 
brothers and sisters, diminished the incentive for the strong, swift, and 
clever to search for new carrion. The Act thus tended to eliminate the 
gains (even if they were only in the form of scraps) to the flock from 
the extra carcasses which might have been found by the strong had 
they the former, larger incentive to search. As a consequence, by the 
time carrion was found by the flock, much if not all of the meat had 
rotted off the bones. The corpses with meat on them seemed to have 
fewer pounds of it. That led to proposals to pay a bounty to any vul-
ture discovering a corpse. 44 
There is an analogous potential social cost ofbankruptcy.45 To the 
extent it works, it eliminates part of the competitive advantage of cred-
itors who are master monitors46 and capable collectors, raising the 
cost of credit to the level charged by less efficient creditors. Whether 
our lower credit costs gained by eliminating common pools outweigh 
our losses from having to borrow at rates which protect less effective 
lenders is a question to which we have no direct answer. At present, 
creditors actually get very little out of bankruptcy so the savings we 
obtain from a supposedly superior salvage technique look small. Since 
most bankruptcy estates are empty ones, it may be that the superior 
collectors already do get paid, so we may not be paying extra. The 
free riders may be getting nothing. In that case, of course, bankruptcy 
is a pure waste, since it costs us to undertake the proceedings, but we 
do not really get anything for it. (The butchers, however, may live 
happily ever after.) 
A pro rata formula can be justified only as the best we can do 
lacking more information (at the time the statute is being drafted). 
44. See, e.g., T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 207; Lopucki, supra note 3, at 363-68. Of course, 
bounties are difficult to design. Among other things, vultures competing for bounties tend to 
look just like vultures competing for carcasses, with much duplication of effort, attempts to dis-
guise it, etc. Indeed, the argument that priority systems among creditors might be justified as 
devices which prevent such waste has been made by Anti-Murphians in other contexts. See 
Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143 
(1979); Levmore, Monitors and Freeriders in Commercial and Corporate Settings, 92 YALE L.J. 
49 (1982). For an analysis of a similar problem suggesting that such duplications of effort are 
likely to be inevitable, see also Goldberg, Fishing and Selling, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 173 (1986). 
Indeed, if the theory ofFlankruptcy is that its collective nature is intended to benefit vultures, 
one would expect the vultures to be initiating a substantial portion of these beneficial proceed-
ings. In fact, it is the carcasses who are the movers in most cases. See supra note 17. 
45. See, e.g., Weston, Some Economic Fundamentals for an Analysis of Bankruptcy, LAW & 
CoNTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1977, at 47, 48 (1977) (arguing that while complete relaxation of 
bankruptcy laws may harm borrowers more than help them, some further relaxation would en-
hance the existing social benefits of the credit system, providing "greater net social benefits"). 
46. See supra note 22. 
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Real vultures, like real debtors and creditors, in real cases know which 
vultures are strong and which are weak. The pro rata requirement is 
intended to force them to behave as though they were ignorant. The 
information they have (but must disregard) as parties to a legislated 
pro rata creditors' or vultures' bargain, is socially valuable. Making 
life run as though people are ignorant wastes the value of their infor-
mation which is likely to be substantial. Real creditors striking real, 
presumably optimal bargains would arrive at distributional terms 
shaped by that information. The "Bankruptcy Bargain" is thus, even 
in theory, suboptimal. In order to evaluate the bargain paradigm it 
must be compared with the claim that somehow debtor or creditor 
behavior, as shaped by nonbankruptcy law, is likely to be defective. 
Even if common pool problems resulted in suboptimal distributions, 
two suboptimal regimes must be compared. It is Murphian Truth that 
life is nothing but the process of choosing between evils. The issue 
always is: which is the lesser? I suggest below that debtors are likely 
to make distributions of their diminishing assets using real, not hypo-
thetical, information and, by doing so, tend to optimize the value of 
the distributions to the debtor and creditors as a group. For now I 
conclude only that bankruptcy is not delivering what the theory 
promises and that the case for an Act improved by any sort of tinker-
in~ is, at best, unproved. 
2. The Logical Problems with the Parable 
One reason why the benefits predicted by the parable seldom mate-
rialize is that the logic of the parable is flawed. Debtor-creditor games 
are different from vulture-carrion games. Since the Anti-Murphian 
logic assumes the games are alike, its foundations are faulty. Even 
brilliant engineering cannot save a structure erected on that assump-
tion. The Bargain Theory errs by ignoring the economics of failure in 
our real Murphian world. 
Common pools have unowned, nonreactive resources in the pool. 
The fish in the sea, the oil and gas in the ground, and the soil and grass 
in the tragic feudal commons do not care who captures them. 47 In our 
fable, the forlorn critter caught dying in the desert is likewise a purely 
passive character in the plot. Dead, he does not care how his carcass 
is butchered or which vulture gets the stew meat and which gets the 
soup bones. In real debtor-creditor relationships, debtors are not pas-
47. For examples of analyses of common pools, see Friedman, The Economics of the Com-
mon Pool: Property Rights in Exhaustible Resources, 18 UCLA L. REv. 855 (1971) (mentioning 
oil and gas reservoirs and fisheries among other examples); Hardin, The Tragedy of the Com-
mons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968) (unowned grazing land). 
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sive. For that reason, such relationships do not generate common 
pools. Moreover, the classical prescription for solving a common pool 
problem is to create property rights in the assets in the pool.48 In the 
real Murphian world, the pool consisting of the debtor's assets is al-
ready "owned" by someone - the debtor. Bankruptcy law cannot, 
therefore, be justified as an efficient solution for a common pool. 
To adapt the parable to reality, assume that critters are in herds 
owned by debtors and replace the vultures in the story with a number 
of equally hungry creditors. If the owner-debtors can be forced by any 
nonbankruptcy creditors' remedy to dole out the value of the critters 
to creditors, those debtors have every interest in butchering the critters 
at the moment they achieve optimum weight into optimal proportions 
of steak and hamburger.49 In other words, once a property right is 
granted to a debtor over her own assets she will maximize their value 
for her own benefit. In doing so, she will take into account the costs to 
her creditors as well. 
For the logic of the pool argument to hold, incentives for the 
owner of pool assets to react must somehow disappear. That allegedly 
happens on "insolvency."50 If all the benefits from feeding and care-
fully butchering the critters will inevitably be captured by creditors, 
the debtor allegedly no longer has any incentive to maximize asset 
value. 51 Hence, the argument goes, control should pass to the credi-
tors who do have the incentive, if they are forced to act cooperatively. 
The insolvency argument is both factually and theoretically in er-
ror. Insolvency is not the point at which the maximization motive 
shifts from debtors to creditors if insolvency is measured by the mar-
ket. Market value is an imperfect measure of the value of the assets to 
48. See, e.g., Friedman, supra note 47, at 872-84; Hardin, supra note 47, at 1245. 
49. Without creditors, debtors may maximize in another fashion - if the debtors prefer 
hamburger, they will butcher it that way. Stated didactically, people will maximize the value of 
their assets according to their own preferences. That value is not necessarily the market value. 
Nevertheless, in order to minimize losses, when one has creditors whose claims can only be 
satisfied by a market transaction, one will then have an incentive to maximize market values as 
well. 
50. T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 122. 
51. Common pool theorists do predict that debtors will react to losses by acting perversely. 
They assume that insolvent debtors are willing to engage in high risk behavior since, after the 
insolvency point, they keep the gains from undertaking risk, but the losses are imposed on their 
creditors. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper Domain, 38 
V AND. L. REv. 829, 833-34 (1985). The perversity assumption conflicts with the passivity pre-
sumption. The more at-risk-to-creditors assets the debtors have available to gamble with, the 
better off debtors are. This means it is unlikely that they will remain passive even if they are 
insolvent. My argument below challenges the notion that many debtors are truly insolvent when 
all their wealth is taken into account, and shows that there are forces which lead debtors to want 
to hold wealth in forms accessible to creditor seizure. In any case, the perversity presumption 
may justify stronger or better creditors' remedies, but does not justify a collective remedy, since if 
it is true, it tends to negate the existence of a common pool. 
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their owners who ordinarily value them for their infra-marginal rents 
(consumer or producer surpluses) and their marginal quasi rents.52 
Thus market-insolvent debtors have incentives to maximize the value 
of the assets in their portfolios to retain as much of the rents as 
possible. 
Not only is the "insolvency" assumption unjustifiable, but also in 
the real Murphian world the market-insolvent debtor can gain by 
choosing which creditors to pay. The available data indicate that in-
solvent debtors do liquidate and distribute their own estates until they 
have no distributable value to any remaining creditors. 53 That is far 
beyond the point of market insolvency (the level at which the market 
value of the debtor's assets is just under the aggregate of the creditors' 
claims). Such observed behavior provides strong indication that the 
debtor passivity implicitly assumed in the Creditors' Bargain model 
exists in theory but not in the real world. 54 What we need is either a 
new world which actually suffers from the defect of debtor docility or 
a new theory which explains the behavior of failing debtors. Inasmuch 
as revising the world to make it match the theory is the more difficult 
choice, I will take the easy route and explore the principles of failure. 
Ill. INTRODUCTION TO MURPHIAN EcONOMICS: AsSET 
MANAGEMENT IN THE FACE OF FAILURE 
The affinity between Murphian philosophy and economics was rec-
ognized in the early histories of both disciplines. Indeed, one of the 
first triumphs of economics, the Malthusian theory, resulted from 
52. See, e.g., D.B. Johnsen, Specialization, Specificity, and Contracting (1988) (working pa-
per, Business and Public Policy Group, Texas A & M University; manuscript on file at the 
Michigan Law Review); J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 218-21, 390-92 (3d 
ed. 1984). This point will be elaborated upon in Part III infra. For present purposes, it can be 
simply explained as follows: People value their nonmarginal assets more than the highest bidder 
in the market values them. Otherwise they would sell out to that bidder. That is why it is 
plausible to say that market prices do not reflect how much people value their assets. The differ-
ence between how much people value their assets as they are currently being used, and the 
amount they value those assets in their next best use (which may be by converting them to cash 
in the market) is what we mean by "surpluses" and "rents." If, for example, you would be 
willing to pay as much as $1.50 for a gallon of gasoline, but the market is currently offering it to 
you at $1.00, you have fifty cents of"rent" in the gallon you just bought. If you used that money 
to buy a beer which was barely worth fifty cents to you, your rent takes the form of that beer. 
53. The data cited supra note 2 strongly supports this conclusion. 
54. It is possible that the prevalence of zero-asset bankruptcy cases could also be explained 
by pre-petition levies and garnishments. This is not my experience, or that of most of the practi-
tioners to whom I have spoken, but it is still possible. A recent study of over 1500 bankruptcy 
cases showed that of the over 15,000 creditors making claims in those cases, only about four 
percent had commenced any pre-bankruptcy collection proceedings. T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN 
& J. WESTBROOK, supra note 2, at 305. Nevertheless, the theory developed below will also indi-
cate that those creditors who do levy or garnish and thereby make recoveries are probably the 
ones who should recover. 
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Malthus' attempt to confirm that Lullihan's Lemma ("If at first you 
don't succeed, don't be surprised.") applied to economic phenomena. 
Somewhere we lost the insight that the dismal science grew from the 
same root as the dialectics of doom. In this part I hope to reestablish 
that lost connection. I will use economic assumptions, thus establish-
ing that both economics and collection law are really incomplete sub-
branches of the Murphian Cosmos. 
In Part II, I showed that the common pool explanation for the 
existence of classic bankruptcy law suffers from an implicit logical er-
ror - it assumes debtors will remain passive when faced with failure. 
The passivity presumption effectively permits theorists to ignore the 
existence of debtors. Anti-Murphians focus entirely on the direct rela-
tionship between predators and assets, the interaction which creates 
the common pool problem. Murphian theory, by contrast, assumes 
that the interaction between creditors and assets will be mediated by 
the actions of debtors, the very characters whose existence we can eas-
ily observe but whom Bargain Theorists ignore. The data suggest that 
debtors are not passive, but instead react to creditors or vultures with 
the result that bankruptcy estates are mostly empty. What remains to 
be shown is how they can be expected to react and whether those reac-
tions should be praised or condemned. 
It is customary when confecting theories, even those about life in 
the shadow of Murphy's Law, to begin by making assumptions. I 
shall start by presupposing six facts about the world. The first two are 
plausible to anyone sensitive to the Murphian muse and, therefore, 
will be retained throughout the argument. They are: 
(1) That debtors (or "Victims" to use the precise Murphian termi-
nology) not only exist, but also are rational. (Murphy never said that 
folks don't try their best. He merely questioned whether they gained 
much by it.)55 
(2) That the world is also populated by a number of marauding mu-
tant rational vultures who eat pots of gold and when gold gets scarce, 
snack on other assets as well. 56 
The final four facts illustrate the essential difference between the 
55. Unfortunately Murphy was never explicit on why he felt this way, so that even to this 
day it is unclear whether we should credit him rather than Herbert Simon with authorship of the 
bounded rationality concept. See H. SIMON, MODELS OF MAN (1957). On the other hand, he 
may have sensed instinctively that divining precisely how people rationalize is itself a compli-
cated question. See, e.g., Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual Decisionmaking: An Essay on 
the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the Management of Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. RBv. 
329 (1986). 
56. If you prefer less colorful abstractions, this can be rephrased as an assumption that the 
effects of losses are mediated through the rationality of individual economic actors, like vultures 
or creditors. 
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Murphian and Anti-Murphian world views. We shall begin by assum-
ing, mistakenly: 
(3) That everything of value in the world is perfectly divisible into 
infinitely small units; 
(4) That all those units are costlessly traded in perfect markets; 
(5) That all those assets are edible as far as vultures are concemed;57 
and 
(6) That Congress has abolished creditors' remedies, which means, 
of course, that but for contributory stupidity and other manifestations of 
Murphy's Law, there would be no creditors either. 58 (The decision to 
ignore the existence of creditors here was not intended as a perverse re-
action to the decision of the Anti-Murphians to ignore debtors. I am 
merely being explicit and will abandon the assumption before arriving at 
any ultimate conclusions.) 
The relaxation of each of these assumptions, in tum, and their re-
placement with their real-life (Le., Murphian) converses will demon-
strate the errors which underlie the false presumption of victim 
passivity, and at the same time demonstrate how praiseworthy the be-
havior of Victims really is likely to be. A few other assumptions will 
also be made as they become relevant. 
A. Dealing with Disaster: Elementary Loss Minimization by 
Victims Owning Divisible Assets in Worlds 
with Pelfect Markets 
I shall start by presupposing that vultures worry about whether 
Victims have wealth. Since none of this would be of interest unless, at 
least occasionally, Victims do, we will initially take it for granted that 
Victims own Things that vultures want. For simplicity, we will begin 
by assuming that there are only two kinds of assets in the world, beer 
and gasoline. The question that remains is: what happens to those 
Things when things go sour. · 
It has long been known that if a Victim has a stock of Things, he 
probably has a variety. Victims prefer having some gasoline and some 
beer to having a lot of one and none of the other because the more 
gasoline each has, the less another gallon is worth to him. Conversely 
57. The Murphian edibility assumption rephrased in more conventional terms can be re-
stated as: All assets in the world are desired by all vultures for their own sake; or, more colloqui-
ally, "I want whatever you have." We will consider a world in which debtors, for example, can 
own assets that creditors might never want when this assumption is later relaxed. 
58. This means, of course, that I am assuming that all Victims are solvent (since they have no 
debt). For a quibble on my implicit assumption that the absence of legal remedies necessarily 
means the absence of creditors, and therefore that there is no debt so a Victim can never be under 
water (Le., insolvent), see Goetz & Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of 
Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261 (1980); Kronman, Contract Law and the State of Nature, 1 J.L. 
EcoN. & 0RG. 5 (1985). 
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the fewer cans of beer each owns, the more he is willing to work or pay 
to get another. Economists call that phenomenon the "Law of De-
mand." Victims who start with a lot of gasoline, therefore, will trade 
some of it to get beer. If they own these Things to make profits,59 they 
will sell off gasoline, and buy beer until the extra money they expect to 
make by keeping a gallon of gas is more than they think they will earn 
by trading it for another can of beer. On the other hand, if they own 
either or both Things for personal consumption, they will trade off 
gasoline until the anticipated extra value of keeping the last gallon is 
more than the extra value they count on getting from trading it for 
another quantity of beer. 60 
Both producer and consumer Victims suffer heartburn because just 
when they have their inventories of gasoline and beer adjusted to an 
optimal ratio, things change. Possibly the market price of beer goes 
up; maybe Jack the Ripper endorses beer on television; perhaps tech-
niques are invented which permit what was formerly done with a lot of 
beer to be done with a lot less. Those events may make the gasoline 
left in our Victim's portfolio relatively more valuable to him than beer. 
The rise in beer prices raises the opportunity cost of holding beer rela-
tive to the cost of holding gasoline, and thus will induce the owner to 
sell off a few of the now high-priced beers, and replace them with a few 
gallons of the now relatively cheaper gasoline. 61 The television en-
dorsement and the technological change may make our owner desire 
beer less than he used to so he will sell some off, replacing it with the 
(relatively) more highly desired gasoline. In any event, changes in 
taste or technology and fluctuating market prices for assets harass 
59. As would a saloon owner who tried to lower delivery costs by picking up his inventory 
with his own truck at his supplier's brewery. 
60. The discussion oversimplifies by positing that portfolios are adjusted by actual barters of 
beer for gasoline. In the ordinary conduct of either life or business, the trade-off decisions are 
more likely to be made in the context of deciding how much of an expended stock of an asset to 
replace for cash in a market. The point that the last item in any collection is worth less than the 
first to buyers and worth more to sellers is not dependent on the bartering context. Readers 
whose co=on sense is not attracted by this proposition may find it helpful to contemplate more 
concrete examples, like how much they might be willing to pay for a second and then a third 
giant sized onion and anchovy pizza with one already in front of them on the table; or, whether 
when trapped for a couple of days in the desert with a thousand cans of cold beer, they would 
charge a prospector they encounter there the same for a can as they would charge had they only 
a single can left. Those dissatisfied by barnyard-level economics or more comfortable with for-
mal presentations, graphs, equations, and the works may wish to consult a standard economics 
text which discusses the consequences of declining marginal utility of goods for consumers and 
declining marginal productivity (increasing marginal costs) of inputs for producers. See, e.g., W. 
FELLNER, MODERN EcONOMIC ANALYSIS chs. 14-16 (1960). 
61. Folklore has it that this phenomenon torpedoed the famous Texas Hunt Brothers in their 
attempt to comer the silver market. When the market value of their flatware skyrocketed, many 
more folks than the Hunts anticipated decided that it was too expensive to eat with, compared 
with what else could be purchased with the proceeds if it were melted down and sold. 
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profit or value maximizing Victims into redoing their portfolios all 
over again. Thus do Murphians explain the existence both of brokers 
and Bromo-Seltzer. 
Similar adjustments are occasioned by changes in wealth. 62 Pop 
quizzes in Econ 101 always have questions like: "What if a lucky fel-
low receives a surprise bequest of gasoline from his mother-in-law's 
second cousin?" The answer is something like: "His equilibrium is 
disturbed by the necessity that he decide how much of the new gaso-
line to keep, and how much to trade for new beer. He will end up with 
extra quantities of both if they are superior goods63, sell both if they 
are inferior, 64 or buy the superior good and sell off the inferior one. If 
they are complements,65 they will be bought (or sold) together. The 
relative proportions bought or sold will depend on their respective in-
come elasticities of demand (Engle Curves). Etc. Etc."66 
Windfalls, of course, explain nothing about bankruptcy. Murphi-
ans have always complained that quizzes assume wealth increases. 
Tests never ask: "What if an asset-eating vulture came and snarfed up 
a six-pack of Victim's beer?" Bankruptcy lawyers and creditors, how-
ever, are very interested in what Victims might do when they experi-
ence losses. By symmetrical conversity, losing Victims will buy 
replacement beer (or some inferior goods). Gasoline will, therefore, be 
traded for the replacements. Just as windfall recipients maximize the 
value of new wealth by making a series of investment decisions, debt-
ors in the real world minimize the impact of losses by redoing their 
portfolios, making an analogous set of disinvestment decisions. 67 If 
62. Note that there is also a wealth (income) effect of the price changes and taste changes 
hypothesized in the preceding paragraph. If, for example, the market price of beer declines, the 
beer owner is poorer after the price change. The decline in wealth may affect how he decides to 
change the ratio of beer to gasoline in his portfolio. This effect is in addition to the incentives to 
readjust ratios caused by the changes in relative beer/gasoline prices. See, e.g., R. MILLER, 
EcONOMICS TODAY, THE MICRO VIEW 34-36 (5th ed. 1985). 
63. Superior goods are those for which the demand increases with increasing wealth. Steak 
or diamonds are prototypical. In a two-asset world, of course, alternative investments in superior 
(or inferior) goods are not possible. The reference to their existence here thus is getting slightly 
ahead of our story. 
64. Inferior goods are those for which demand rises as wealth declines. Beans or potatoes 
tend to replace steak or diamonds in people's inventories as they experience difficulties. 
65. Complementary goods are those whose value increases when used in combination with 
each other. Computers and printers, for example, are complements. Substitute goods have the 
opposite relationship; typewriters and word processors are an example. 
66. J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 52, at 98-106 and 327-44 gives a more complete answer for 
consumer portfolios and producer portfolios respectively. Like most other economists, he shows 
his Anti-Murphian biases. The mathematical functions which he labels the "Income Expansion 
Path," for example, could and probably should in the Murphian Universe be called the "Income 
Contraction Path" instead. Id. at 99. 
67. Disinvestment means, of course, that future income is sacrificed to enhance present in-
come. That people in trouble begin to consume their savings, or attempt to accelerate future 
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portfolios of wealth consisted solely of gasoline and beer, we know 
gasoline will be sold off when there is a loss of beer. 68 
By now you may be wondering "who cares?" Other vultures 
would prefer the beer were left for them to guzzle. The Victim proba-
bly wishes he had never heard of vultures. But these preferences are 
weak since a can of beer is, after all, a small asset. Even were six 
taken, six times a small value still adds up to a small loss. Neverthe-
less, even if Victims and the other vultures rue the loss, does anybody 
mind when the Victim thereafter converts some gasoline back into 
beer? Not when there are perfect markets for gasoline and beer. If 
gasoline can always be costlessly traded for beer, any vulture who pre-
fers gasoline can seize beer and costlessly convert it back again into 
gasoline. In a perfect two-asset world, the Victim would thus mini-
mize his losses by adjusting the proportions of the assets held in his 
portfolio, and no vulture would care what the proportions were. 69 
Pareto Murphy, Edsel's second son, actually noted that this seeming 
tendency toward optimality constituted a potential counterexample to 
his father's law.70 We shall investigate the errors which led to this 
income into the present by borrowing more, is a testable hypothesis that emerges from Murphian 
theory. 
68. To be perfectly theoretically correct, we do not know whether this will happen for cer· 
tain. We do know that rational Victims will be systematically influenced by what is called the 
"substitution effect" to behave in this manner. The loss, however, may also trigger a "wealth" or 
"income effect" in the Victim, which will change his behavior in a nonsystematic manner. See, 
e.g., W. BAUMOL, supra note 25, at 209-12. 
69. Strictly speaking, this need not always be true. It happens that I am indifferent about 
whether your portfolio consists of Gizmos or Doodads. If the assets in question were heroin, or 
Saturday Night Specials, I might feel differently. Some of my fundamentalist and feminist 
friends care a great deal about whether someone they have never met might be losing his or her 
soul or sensitivity by collecting pornography. I have Marxist acquaintances who care on differ-
ent grounds - primarily that nobody should have any wealth at all because they might use it to 
oppress people. They conclude we should tum our wealth over to politicians to protect ourselves 
from each other, at least until we all finally undergo complete personality changes. That view 
has always struck me as having interesting Murphian implications. 
The Bankruptcy Code does seem to reflect some desire to encourage certain types of activity 
and to discourage other types on essentially political grounds. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § S07(a)(S) 
(1988) (giving priority to persons who store grain and fish with bankrupt warehouses, but no 
such favoritism to people who store other goods); 11 U.S.C. § S02(b)(6)-(b)(7) (1988) (disallow-
ing claims by holders of certain leases and employment contracts when similar long-term con· 
tractual claims by holders of economically similar contracts are allowed). These provisions may 
reflect society's views that those who invest in catching fish and growing grain are good and that 
those who invest in rental real estate or job specific skills are bad. In general, however, our law of 
property and creditors' remedies does not seem to address specific concerns that people should or 
should not hold certain types of assets. You may take my assertion that the vultures don't care, 
therefore, as one that the law generally doesn't care. The model being formulated here does deal 
below, see infra text following note 98, with the consequences that creditors may care about the 
market value if not the specific identity of the assets in which debtors choose to invest. 
70. Mrs. Edsel Murphy was Italian. Pareto was her maiden name. Only in a Murphian 
world could it happen that a distant relative of his in-laws would decades later formulate a 
welfare criterion which closely resembles this early false step in the development of Murphy's 
metaphysics. 
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unwarranted apprehension, when we drop our un-Murphian assump-
tions about the world. 
Suppose now that Victim has three types of wealth rather than 
two. Besides gasoline and beer, he owns liquid laundry detergent. 
Like gasoline, detergent can be sold off to replace lost beer. We know 
from a two-asset world that losses lead to disinvestment. How will a 
Victim choose between detergent and gasoline when he disinvests? If 
gasoline and detergent are equally divisible into very small units, and 
if those units can be costlessly exchanged for beer, a Victim will be 
indifferent about which to trade first because the value of the last 
ounce of detergent he owns will be precisely equal to the value of the 
last unit of gasoline. (Otherwise, in a world in which one could 
costlessly be converted into the other, he would already have traded 
the less for the more valuable of the two.) Furthermore, which he 
trades first doesn't matter much because after the first unit of one asset 
is traded, the next unit will be one of the other assets (because the last 
remaining unit of the untraded class will now, by hypothesis, be worth 
less than the former next-to-last item of the class selected initially). In 
other words, we expect in a perfect world that Victim's response to 
minor misfortune is to disinvest proportionately in all his other assets 
to replace those lost. 
That would be fine with all vultures. Why? Because in a three-
asset world, just as in the two-asset version, the vulture needn't care 
about which assets Victims decide to own. Any vulture can costlessly 
convert whatever she grabs into whatever she wants most. To summa-
rize, in a perfect world, Victims will minimize the impact of losses by 
readjusting their portfolios. Vultures won't care what assets Victims 
hold and what they do with them in making the readjustments. In a 
perfect world, therefore, Victims are likely to be the optimal liquida-
tors of their own affairs. By the same token, however, the Victim is 
also indifferent about which asset the vultures choose to seize. He can 
replace any seized asset by costlessly converting any others he owns 
and thus will end up with an optimal portfolio regardless whether it is 
he or the vultures who choose which assets are to be consumed. 71 
If all assets in the world are literally and figuratively liquid, we 
have shown that both Victims and vultures would be indifferent to 
each others' behavior. Indifference suggests passivity, of course. In a 
perfect world things tum out perfectly no matter what happens. No-
body need care what happens in such a world, but then again, chang-
71. This conclusion is simply another application of the Cease theorem, that in a world with-
out transaction costs, optimal resource allocation will be reached regardless of the allocation of 
property rights. See Cease, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960). 
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ing anything because of that indifference also would be unnecessary. 
Murphians have seldom taken comfort from that theoretical 
possibility. 
B. Loss Minimization with Indivisible Assets in 
Well-Functioning Markets 
Alas, the world isn't perfect, as Murphy well knew. Assets don't 
come in finely divisible units, but rather in discrete economic lumps. 
Suppose critters come in three varieties, Goodzes, Betrs, and Bezzts, 
and Victim owns one of each. Each weighs one hundred pounds and 
can be sold for butchering for one dollar per pound. Victim, however, 
has trained his Goodz to play the fiddle, his Betr to juggle flaming 
torches, and his Bezzt to walk on a tightrope. As performing animals, 
their values no longer depend on their divisibility into pounds of meat, 
but rather on what they will bring if sold to circuses. 72 Figure One 
portrays such a portfolio. 
Suppose, as shown, Victim would pay as much as $1600 for his 
Bezzt, $1200 for his Betr, and $800 for his Goodz.73 If we treat the 
dotted line as the market price for each asset (assuming a perfect mar-
ket), each can be costlessly converted to $800 cash.74 Initially it ap-
pears irrational that Victim would tolerate this state of affairs. Why 
hasn't he sold the Goodz for $800 and used it to purchase another 
72. Of course, if there were ways to accomplish it legally, the services of the animals could be 
sold by some divisible time unit. Indeed, in an economic sense, the value of any asset is the 
presently capitalized value of its future services which are nearly always potentially divisible. In 
a world in which the extension of economic credit cannot be legally protected, however, it is 
difficult to make such divisions by contract. Since vultures are unlikely to wait long enough for 
debtors to divide their assets over time, we will ignore that possibility in the analysis that follows. 
73. This assumption means that, if he had no Bezzts, he would buy one if the market price 
were less than $1600, and ifthere were no markets, the Victim wouldn't agree to sell one for less 
than that amount. Of course, since there is a market price in the figure ($800) he wouldn't really 
pay more than $800 to any seller since he could always get what he wanted on the market for 
that price. Also, since there is a market, he would take anything over $800 for his Bezzt, use 
$800 of the sale proceeds to replace it and keep the balance as an increase in wealth. In the 
absence of markets, what he would pay and what he would take are identical at the margin. The 
differences between the market values in the diagram and the Victim's values (the lined areas in 
the diagram) arise from the presence of rents. Why do rents exist? For individuals, willingness 
to pay much more than the current market price can be ascribed to strongly felt needs or desires 
for the good in question. Some people want tightrope-walking Bezzts a lot more than others. 
For firms, rents usually arise because the asset is very specialized, and thus extremely valuable to 
the firm, but not to other buyers in the market who do not have the specialized use for it. See 
references cited supra note 52. 
74. The assumption that the market prices are the same for each of these assets is made 
simply for analytical convenience. The point illustrated, that market prices do not reflect the 
Victim's values so that he does have preferences about the assets in his portfolio which do not 
correlate with market prices, is simply made more clear. A more elaborate model which as-
sumed different market prices and rents for different assets would reach the same conclusion, but 
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Bezzt worth $1600 to him? Recall the declining value phenomenon 
underlying the law of demand. 75 Although the first Bezzt is worth 
$1600 to him, he values the second at less than $800. If trained Bezzts 
only come in indivisible chunks, the portfolio shown above can be op-
timal and is worth $3600 to its owner. 
Now suppose Victim's Bezzt is eaten by a vulture. In Murphian 
75. See supra text accompanying note 60. 
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reality, losses are no longer insignificantly small. Even though his as-
sets have equal market prices, the Victim values them differently. He 
will sell the asset he values least, the Goodz, for $800 and use the cash 
to replace the bolted Bezzt. 76 (If the vulture ate the less highly prized 
Betr, the result is the same so long as it could be replaced by sale of the 
same Goodz.) When markets function well, Victims can convert any 
disaster into losses of the least valued assets in their portfolios. 
Whichever asset the vulture eats, the Victim's inventory, after adjust-
ment, will consist of one Bezzt and one Betr. When markets work 
well, Victims are indifferent about which assets are lost (or seized) just 
as vultures are indifferent about which assets Victims maintain for 
them to grab, because either can costlessly use the markets to convert 
any asset they retain or grab into whichever substitute of equal market 
value yields them the greatest rent. Table One, below, illustrates the 
Victim's history after the vulture raid. 
TABLE ONE 
ADJUSTMENTS TO PORTFOLIOS OF INDIVISIBLE AsSETS 
IN A WORLD WITH PERFECT MARKETS 
Original After After 
Assets Position Loss Adjustment 
Bezzt $1600 $1600 
Betr 1200 1200 1200 
Goo dz 800 800 
Value to Victim 3600 2000 2800 
Market Value 2400 1600 1600 
While nothing can reduce the market value of the loss Victim has suf-
fered, the portfolio adjustment apparently permits him to limit his 
losses to that amount, and convert the loss of an asset which has high 
rents to him into the loss of an asset with zero rents. In other words, 
the adjustment makes the portfolio more valuable to the Victim, but 
need not affect its market value. 
The apparent loss may understate the impact of the vulture raid on 
the Victim, however. Losses, even minimized by a portfolio adjust-
ment, are not necessarily limited to the $800 illustrated in the table. 
Another consequence of the seizure, which I shall designate as a 
"wealth effect," may occur as well. Table One credits Victim with 
valuing his portfolio, after adjustment, at $2800 which means we as-
76. The wealth loss may cause the Victim to adjust by buying some inferior good, instead. So 
long as the inferior good purchased is traded in markets as perfect as the market for Bezzts and 
Gooclzes, however, that possibility does not affect the analysis. 
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sume the rent values for his Bezzt ($800) and his Betr ($400) remain 
the same after the loss as before. However, the very notion of a rent 
incorporates an assumed contingency. Rents are determined by com-
paring present values of assets to their owners with their alternative 
values in other possible circumstances such as their sale value in a 
market or their value in some other use. 77 
In the absence of any markets, the Victim holding the readjusted 
portfolio would refuse any offers for either the Bezzt or the Betr ofless 
than $1600 and $1200 respectively; but as long as potential offerors 
can obtain Bezzts and Betrs in the market for $800, the prospect of 
such offers actually being made is minimal. The contingency with 
which we are concerned in a Murphian World is not the existence of 
such unlikely future offers but instead the probability that losses will 
continue. 
If the vultures now seize the replacement Bezzt (the future state of 
the world which, for bankruptcy purposes, we care about), Victim will 
agree to take $800 from the market for the Betr so that the cash can be 
used to replace the Bezzt a third time. Thus, in the only contingency 
that counts, the seizure of the Bezzt not only reduces the value of the 
portfolio by the amount of the market value of the least valued asset 
but also potentially destroys the rent value of the least valued asset in 
the remaining portfolio (or the next-to-the-least valued asset in the ini-
tial collection). The more likely it is that the Betr will have to be used 
to preserve the value of the Bezzt, the more its value sinks from the ex 
ante $1200 to a bankruptcy level of $800. This $400 additional loss is 
the wealth effect which must be accounted for as a result of the vulture 
raids. 
While the Victim might say that he values his Betr at $1200, and 
several swamis serving as expert witnesses might certify that he speaks 
the truth, the loss of the Goodz took away any resources Victim could 
use to demonstrate his willingness to pay for a new Betr.78 If any fur-
77. 
To be precise, an asset's quasi rent must always be qualified . . . . This is because there are 
many alternative future states of the world that will reduce the market value of the asset in 
its current use and simultaneously determine the character and value of its next best use. 
More important, it is the value of the asset in its next best use under each specific contin-
gency that determines the relevant quasi rent. 
D.B. Johnsen, supra note 52, at 8-9; "In practice, moreover, all rents are quasi rents." Id. at 8 
n.9. 
78. If the Victim would not take $1200 for the Betr that remains in his portfolio, it can be 
argued that the surplus or quasi-rent value remains. The decision to define surpluses in terms of 
what he would pay instead is a conservative assumption in the context of this analysis, which is 
made for two reasons. First, if demonstrable incentives exist for Victims to control their own 
affairs under conservative assumptions, it is obvious that under the less restrictive premises, the 
argument is even stronger. Second, to the extent that we conduct this analysis for the purposes 
of eventually attempting to fashion legal rules, there is an additional reason for being conserva-
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ther losses occur, Victim will in fact be not only unwilling, but also 
unable to replace the Betr. In an environment of continuing losses, it 
is difficult to credit any claim that the Betr rent is worth anything to 
him. In effect, the loss of the least valuable asset in the portfolio also 
destroys the rents of the next-to-the-least valued asset.79 Thus the 
Bezzt raid cost Victim not only the market value of the Goodz which 
was sold, but also the surplus value of the Betr. 
This model illustrates two simple but very general points about the 
dynamics of failure. First, as losses in wealth occur, Victims will at-
tempt to minimize them by making portfolio adjustments in efforts to 
reach optimal holdings. Second, because assets are indivisible, the 
portfolio will not be liquidated proportionately. Portfolio adjustments 
start with the liquidation of assets whose surplus, idiosyncratic, or spe-
cialized values to their owners are lowest relative to their market val-
ues. The assets that remain in portfolios after adjustment, 
accordingly, tend to be those with the highest relative idiosyncratic or 
specialized values to their owners. The more portfolios have been di-
minished by disaster, the less their market value explains why their 
owners prize them. That is one reason why debtors who are insolvent 
by a market measure are likely to be highly motivated to preserve the 
assets they have left and thus unlikely to be passive when facing risks 
of continuing losses. 
The concentration of specialized or idiosyncratically valued assets 
in portfolios reduced by losses need not result from the adjustment 
decisions of wealth maximizing Victims alone, however. To the extent 
that Victims do not have incentives to make adjustments, vultures 
have incentives to seize the fungible assets, leaving the specialized ones 
behind. Figure Two below shows why. 
In this case, the Victim owns the same three assets. The previous 
example, to simplify the analysis, equated the market prices for the 
three assets. In this case for similar purposes, the value to the Victim 
is the same for each of the assets ($1600) but the market prices vary-
as shown by the starred lines, with Bezzts fetching $800, Betrs $1200, 
and Goodzes $1600. 80 A vulture seizure of any asset will not cause the 
tive. Rules which credit people for valuing things beyond the extent that they can objectively 
show invite claims of entitlements to things based on strategic overstatements of their supposed 
values to the holders. Even Anti-Murphians concede this point. See, e.g., T. JACKSON, s11pra 
note 18, at 126-27 (justifying the use of market values in bankruptcies, even though true subjec-
tive values are the relevant ones when attempting to predict and induce behavior by creating 
legal rules). 
79. This observation should be credited to O'Malley who formulated an early corollary stat-
ing that "Disasters are even worse than you imagine." 
80. Just as we showed that for the portfolio in Figure One declining demand could make it 
optimal, this portfolio can be optimal as well. The reason the Victim does not sell off a $1600 
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Victim to make any post-raid portfolio readjustments. Just as before 
· the raid the Victim would be indifferent to which asset was seized, 
afterwards he is indifferent as between any of the possible combina-
tions of two remaining assets. The Victim passivity induced by this 
indifference does not justify any alarm, however. 
Goodz to buy two $800 Bezzts is that a second and third Bezzt are each worth less than $800 to 
him. 
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When the Victim is apt to be passive, a vulture will prefer to seize 
Goodzes first, and Betrs second. A Goodz can be traded for more of 
the things the seizing vulture wants than can the Betr or Bezzt. Given 
that a seizure is inevitable, the choice of which to seize will be optimal. 
The vulture can benefit more by the appropriate selection without 
making the Victim any worse off. Even when assets are indivisible, as 
long as markets permit vultures to trade things they seize and Victims 
to readjust their portfolios costlessly, losses are minimized whether it 
is the Victim or the vultures who control the choice of assets to be 
seized. The end result, which leaves the Victim's portfolio concen-
trated with more specialized and idiosyncratically valued assets, is the 
same. 
C. Loss Minimization with Indivisible Assets in Worlds of Imperfect 
Markets or Expensive Conversion Techniques 
Transaction costs create unhappiness. When access to markets is 
costly, new preferences may arise about the order in which assets are 
seized. Eventually, transaction costs will limit Victims' abilities to 
make adjustments altogether. 
1. The Consequences of Asymmetrical Costs 
The costs of converting Goodzes into Bezzts may differ as between 
Victims and vultures. Suppose that vultures desire Goodzes not for 
their taste, but rather for their market convertibility into gold. In 
costly, imperfect markets, no Victim would expend resources con-
verting his assets into a form preferred by vultures, but rather would 
let the vultures do their own converting. But suppose that vultures 
must use Goodz auctions held at courthouses for making the conver-
sion and further that courthouse auctions fetch less gold per Goodz 
than trades on the bullion market could net, but only for Victims. The 
differential in conversion costs means that Victims will not, even in the 
circumstances in Figure Two, be indifferent to which assets vultures 
seize. To illustrate with numbers, suppose that Victim can get $1600 
for a Goodz on the bullion market but that vultures can net only about 
$1000 at an auction. If, just prior to the raid, the Victim makes the 
conversion, he can satisfy the vultures' desire for a Goodz and have 
$600 in gold left over.s1 
81. This possibility may not have much utility in a world where vultures cannot be limited to 
accepting the gold, of course, and in which the timing of their raids cannot be reasonably antici-
pated. When creditors' remedies are invented and vultures are converted into creditors, these 
theoretical difficulties, as should be obvious, will be significantly ameliorated. 
It will also be true that if vultures are superior liquidators in a regime where the profits from 
that superiority must be shared with Victims, Victims will permit vultures to do the liquidating. 
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To generalize, Victims will prefer to liquidate their own assets 
when they have access to superior conversion techniques, and to dele-
gate the task of liquidation to vultures when vultures have superior 
access. Victims will tend to select first for liquidation those assets 
which can be most cheaply converted. Vultures' welfare need not suf-
fer if Victims act on those preferences. As Victims' fortunes decline, 
the assets remaining in their portfolios will thus tend to be those which 
are more costly for them to convert to other forms. There are good 
reasons, which we shall soon explore, 82 why Victims may wish to hold 
the extra gold gained by controlling the liquidation. The existence of 
cost differentials in access to conversion techniques gives Victims in-
centives not to remain passive (indifferent about which of a collection 
of equally valued assets the vultures may seize) and ultimately shapes 
the character of the assets held in portfolios compressed by 
misfortune. 
2. Transaction Costs as Constraints 
Even when the conversions cost Victims and vultures the same, 
those costs have other effects on Victims' incentives. Recall the origi-
nal vulture seizure of our Victim's $1600 Bezzt from Figure One. If it 
is costly to resort to markets, transaction costs will affect the sort of 
adjustments that will be possible. At minimum, the total losses will be 
increased by the cost of the adjustments. With indivisible assets, how-
ever, the point will eventually be reached on the slide toward poverty 
at which there are constraints on adjustment which are more expen-
sive than just the conversion costs themselves. 
In Figure One above, 83 the possibility that access to markets can be 
costly is shown by quoting dual prices for assets - bid prices which 
owners can count on receiving, and asked prices which nonowners 
must anticipate having to pay. 84 If assets are indivisible, the added 
costs of conversion will make a simple asset-sale-and-repurchase port-
Thus, were the vultures creditors here, and they rather than the victim could obtain $1600 by 
sale of the Goodz, but had to be satisfied with $1000, the amount of the debt, Victim would 
prefer that vultures handle the sale. In any case, it is likely that Victims will act to see that assets 
are liquidated by the superior liquidator. The data supra note 2 indicates that debtors liquidate 
their assets before they choose bankruptcy. Since they seldom seem to prefer permitting bank-
ruptcy trustees to be liquidators, it is likely they doubt the supposed superiority of bankruptcy as 
a liquidation process. 
82. See infra section 111.D. 
83. Figure One can be found between notes 74 and 75 supra. 
84. The differences are presumably a function of the costs of marketing, whether they be in 
the form of brokerage commissions, or rather in the losses from having capital tied up in un-
wanted assets for the period of waiting time needed to receive an optimum bid price, search costs 
of locating a high enough bidder, and the like. 
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folio adjustment impossible for t)le Victim; while he receives $700 on 
the sale of his Goodz, it takes $800 to buy the replacement Bezzt so 
that a market conversion is impossible.85 The vulture loss remains at 
$1600 and cannot be reduced by a one-step portfolio adjustment. The 
Victim may choose to retain the post-prandial portfolio of a Betr and a 
Goodz. On the other hand, he may choose to make a more substantial 
adjustment by selling both the Betr and the Goodz, raising $1400 in 
cash, and spending $800 of that cash to replace the Bezzt, leaving a 
portfolio of a Bezzt and cash. The seizure and wealth losses using 
both strategies are summarized in Table Two, below. 
TABLE Two 
ADJUSTMENTS TO PORTFOLIOS OF INDIVISIBLE ASSETS 
IN A WORLD OF IMPERFECT MARKETS 
Original After After 
Asset Position Loss Adjustment 
Bezzt $1600 $140()86 
Betr 1200 1200 
Goo dz 800 800 
Cash 600 
Value to Victim 3600 2000 2000 
Market Value (Bid) 2100 1400 130087 
If transactions are costly, it eventually becomes impossible for Vic-
tims to minimize the impact of losses by resorting to markets. The 
portfolio as it existed immediately after the vulture raid is worth to the 
Victim exactly what the only available adjusted portfolio is worth to 
him. 
85. The possibility may have occurred to you that given these bid and asked prices, Victim 
could locate an owner of a Bezzt who wants a Goodz and trade, thus apparently wiping out the 
$100 assumed cost of access to the market. The sad truth is, however, that it may cost more than 
$100 to locate and bargain with such an individual in the real Murphian world. A fellow Mur-
phian who is a professional Aggie as well, Mike Pustay, suggested that I close this loophole. 
86. The reason why the replacement Bezzt's value is $1400 instead of $1600 is explained by 
the wealth effect and the requirement that values be objectively verifiable. See supra note 78 and 
accompanying text. Since in the event of any future raids, the Victim's ability to do anything 
with his portfolio is constrained by the market price for Bezzts plus the value of his cash, $1400 
is all the wealth available to him to preserve his existing Bezzt or acquire a new model, even 
though he would not sell one for less than $1600. 
87. The possibility illustrated here that the market value of the portfolio after an adjustment 
is actually reduced raises the prospect of a conflict between the welfare of Victims and that of 
vultures. The general conditions for such conflicts and means of resolving them are discussed 
below. See infra text accompanying note 98. 
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The risk of being disabled by transaction costs from making loss-
minimizing adjustments creates a desire to hold divisible and cheap-to-
convert assets like gold and ultimately a demand for liquidity and 
credit. Table Three shows what would have happened had the Victim 
in Figure One held $800 in costlessly convertible gold or cash instead 
of his Goodz which could be converted only at an adjustment expense 
of $100. 
TABLE THREE 
ADJUSTMENTS TO PORTFOLIOS OF MIXED AsSETS IN A WORLD 
WITH SOME WELL-FUNCTIONING MARKETS 
Original After After 
Asset Position Loss Adjustment 
Bezzt $1600 $1600 
Betr 1200 1200 80088 
Cash 800 800 
Value to Victim 3600 2000 2400 
Market Value (Bid) 2100 1400 1400 
Comparing Tables Two and Three, one can see that if even one 
asset (like cash) can be nearly costlessly traded, optimal portfolio ad-
justments can still be made even in a world with mostly costly mar-
kets. By holding $800 in cash the Victim can reduce the potential loss 
by $400 when, by holding a Goodz worth $800, he cannot. Indeed, 
with only a small change in the numbers, the Victim's cash holdings 
need not be even $800. Had the Victim holding three expensive-to-
convert assets, as in Figure One, held in addition only $100 in cash, he 
could have, at the cost of that $100 needed to buy access to the mar-
kets, made the same savings in adjusting his portfolio. In a world 
without creditors' remedies, of course, when borrowing even a hun-
dred dollars is impractical, he has no option but to keep his marginally 
valued assets in cash. 
E. Optimal Coping in Environments of Advanced Failure, in the 
Absence of Markets 
O'Flaherty's Fiat, "There is synergy in slippage," limits any strat-
egy for protecting values in indivisible items by holding cheaply liqui-
dated, divisible assets. One limit in a Murphian Universe is the 
88. The reason why this number is $800 instead of $1200 is explained in supra note 86. 
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certainty that vulture losses will continue. The protective liquid assets 
will either be exhausted making portfolio readjustments, or will be di-
rectly consumed by vultures. (It is not only Victims who care about 
the costs of resorting to markets. Vultures seizing cash can convert it. 
into tastier items at lower cost than critters can be similarly converted, 
so vultures will also tend to seize cash first.)89 
Inevitably, then, the Victim's holdings will be reduced to illiquid 
assets. The specialization or idiosyncratic values of these assets are 
likely to be so high, their market values probably so low, and the mar-
kets in which they are traded so expensive to enter, that the use of 
markets as means of minimizing losses at this point can be disre-
garded. 90 Optimistically, presume that the two remaining assets are a 
Bezzt and a Betr and, again for convenience, assume that their market 
values are the same as in Figure One, to wit: $700 (bid). What other 
strategies are available to a Victim bent on preserving the surplus val-
ues in those items? 
Since their (net) market values are equal, the Victim has no reason 
to believe that vultures are likely to seize the remaining items in any 
particular order, so the probabilities of losing either asset in a future 
raid are equal. If losses are to occur, Victim, left without any other 
means to minimize their impact, has a definite preference that Betrs 
rather than Bezzts go first. To restate the significance of this differen-
tial in Victim/vulture incentives, the absence of costless markets cre-
ates a strong desire in the Victim to control rather than leave to 
chance the order in which vultures consume his indivisible assets. 
Vultures are generally indifferent to the order. 
There are obvious gains to be made by an agreement between Vic-
tims and vultures, that Betrs will be the appetizers, leaving Bezzts, if 
they are to be eaten at all, left only for desserts.91 Indivisibility, how-
ever, makes it difficult to find ways to share those gains. The law of 
property which permits sales of fractionalized interests in specific indi-
visible assets, and borrowing which transfers a contingent interest in 
unspecified property, both are obvious techniques for creating other 
ways to share such gains. Unfortunately, both are impractical until 
89. Thus, given the inevitability of seizure, vultures will, in optimal fashion as above, seize 
from mixed portfolios containing liquid and illiquid assets, just those which Victims would 
choose f'or them to seize. 
90. There exist occasional minor possibilities that Betrs can, at some expenditure oflabor, be 
trained to walk tightropes. The point is that markets are not the only process by which an asset 
can be converted into another form. As long as the available nonmarket conversion techniques 
are costly, however, the existence of such possibilities does not alter the above analysis. 
91. The gains to be shared equal the rents saved in the Bezzt discounted by the probability 
that it too may eventually be seized. 
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after remedies are invented. (Once they are, however, grants of secur-
ity interests, which are the equivalent of the sale of a fractional (con-
tingent) property right, could be justified as efficient ways for Victims 
to liquidate their own affairs. It would follow that bankrupts' estates 
would be heavily weighted with encumbered assets. )92 
Protective or insurance measures might reduce the probability of 
future vulture raids. Victim's best strategy is first to take steps which 
increase the probability that if disaster visits again, only the Betr will 
be lost. Wealth maximizing strategies in .the fae<e of such risks include 
hiding the Bezzt behind the Betr, preparing to offer the Betr up with-
out a fight using it as a distraction, or disguising the Bezzt to look like 
a lower-valued asset. Those activities, given the conundrum that there 
is nothing better that can be done, are nevertheless desirable, even op-
timal behavior.93 They increase the probability that eventual disaster 
will be minimized inasmuch as the vultures are indifferent about 
which asset they seize, but the Victim has strong preferences which 
can be satisfied if vultures are induced to choose Betrs before Bezzts. 
Even these protective steps consume resources, however. Given 
the indivisibility of Victim's assets, he has no such resources easily 
available. He really has only two choices. One is to sacrifice the Betr 
in exchange for cash or other divisible assets which can be protectively 
deployed. If the probability of future vulture losses is very high, if the 
costs of protective measures are low, and their efficacy is likely to be 
high, he will make that choice. The lower the probability of eventual 
loss, the more expensive and less effective the available protective 
measures are, the more likely it is that the Vic~im will select the only 
other option, which is to do nothing at all. 
A decision to do nothing looks like passivity, but in circumstances 
of extreme distress inertia can be optimal. Whether it is turns- on 
whether there are open but unavailed-of opportunities worth taking to 
redeploy or adjust the portfolio.94 As long as immediate loss is less 
than certain, Victims have incentives to maximize the value of their 
assets. Of course, with probabilities as high as ninety-nine percent (or 
with the expected duration of even totally effective protective meas-
92. A recent empirical study indicates that this is the case. T. SULLIVAN, E. WARREN & J. 
WESrBROOK, supra note 2, at 185-87, 306. 
93. Even so, and for reasons that are not always easy to understand, some of these measures 
fit into the category of bankruptcy crimes, which means that they are grounds for denials of a 
discharge and possible ineligibility for certain other relief. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (1988) 
(concealing property from a creditor is grounds for denial of a bankruptcy discharge). 
94. The mere fact that we may, after the fact, speculate that there were some possible alterna-
tives is ambiguous. Bounded rationality does not require that the Victim be perfect, only that he 
try his best. After-the-fact discovery of roads not taken may confuse bounded rationality with 
passivity. 
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ures down to a few minutes) the discounted expected value of his fu-
ture portfolio is very low. Not many steps to preserve its value are 
likely to be cheap enough to be worth taking. Given the indifference 
of the Vultures, the choice we want the Victim to make is to do 
nothing. 
The intensity of the Victim's incentives to maximize the value of 
his portfolio is a continuous rather than binary function of two vari-
ables: the probability that the last asset will be seized, and the ex-
pected timing of the seizure. Utter passivity occurs only in the 
extreme case of certainty of immediate seizure when there is no possi-
ble action that can be taken by the Victim to affect either the order, 
timing or the probability of the seizure losses. 9s If the probability of 
seizure is less than total, or if the order or timing of the seizure is 
uncertain, Victims have incentives to maximize their asset values. The 
Common Pool justification for bankruptcy legislation is built on the 
extreme case of absolute debtor certainty of immediate seizure of his 
last asset. Until that point is reached, victims still have incentives to 
react. While such incentives exist, there is no common pool problem. 
There is some logic to the notion that the probability of seizure of 
one's last asset by creditors is very low until the point of market insol-
vency is reached. At the insolvency point, however, it remains low. 
Debtors would become certain that post-insolvency reactions cease to 
be worthwhile only in a world which possesses a number of very un-
real, non-Murphian features. Among them, at minimum, are: that all 
creditors can costlessly determine exactly when the point of insolvency 
is reached, that the odds of the insolvency being permanent are 100%, 
and that creditors can costlessly and immediately exercise their right 
to seizure. Because those assumptions fly in the face of Murphy's 
Law, we can dismiss them. (Indeed, if Murphy's Law were invalid so 
that those assumptions were true, all creditors acting on their own 
would be fully paid from the proceeds of their perfect seizures anyway, 
so we wouldn't ever have to worry about passing bankruptcy acts. 
Collective proceedings would be unnecessary.) 
95. Note that these conditions for passivity are exclusive, and "insolvency" per se is irrele-
vant. None of the conclusions reached above would change if vultures were turned into creditors 
and Victims into debtors whose debts far exceed the value of their assets, but which do not 
mature for 10 years. The insolvency as a source of passivity argument contains the unstated 
assumption that under the current law of creditors' remedies, the more insolvent you are, and the 
closer the time at which your debts mature, the higher the likelihood that creditors will end up 
seizing your assets in the near future. There are, of course, other features of the real world that 
also affect that probability, some of which are discussed below. 
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The above conclusions assume everything of value in the world is 
edible. Before abandoning that assumption, it is first necessary to 
demonstrate that assets exist which are inedible in varying degrees. 
Much wealth takes that form - which means that vultures really 
aren't interested in everything Victims value. 
1. Port(folio)traits of Failures 
Figure Three describes, in abstract terms, the wealth a typical Vic-
tim will seek to maximize. All his assets are put into boxes describing 
characteristics of wealth that Victims and vultures may care about. 
The southwest box is full of Things like Bezzts, Betrs, and Goodzes -
assets held in an illiquid form. Likewise, the southeast box contains 
Things in which others have rights along with the Victim, like his 
mortgaged house and joint bank account. All the contents of these 
two boxes are designated "Property" which is a collection lawyer:'s 
way of saying that a sheriff could get his hands on these Things, a fact 
of some keen interest to creditors who might wish to employ sheriffs if 
creditors' remedies are ever invented. As far as vultures are con-
cerned, property is what is edible. Once sheriffs do become useful, 
some property might be declared exempt from their clutches, i.e., 
made inedible by legislation. Inedibility can result, however, not only 
from statutes, but also from the forces which underlie Murphy's Law. 
The boxes on top illustrate that property is not all the Victim val-
ues. As he shifts his wealth from box to box, the debtor may buy steak 
dinners or film for baby pictures. These assets - his leisure, his fam-
ily, or any specialized asset that is useful to the Victim alone - I have 
put into the northwest box. 
The northeast box contains "nonproperty" that might interest vul-
tures. The Victim may, for example, spend time and money cultivat-
ing his in-laws to increase the likelihood that should trouble come his 
way, they would be willing to bail him out. Valuable expectancies like 
these are assets to the Victim, but not the kind vultures could easily 
seize (or sheriffs could easily capture should we ever invent creditors' 
remedies). 
Victims also hold a similar kind of wealth which I have put in the 
same box but called "potential property." That term might have de-
scribed the entire box. Two labels were used to illustrate that "poten-
tial property" assumes many different forms. I have in mind for the 
subcategory of "potential property" assets like education, experience, 
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skill, ideas, half-completed plans or manuscripts, already acquired in-
formation or, in general, specialized prospects - all things worth in-
vesting in because someday the investment might be convertible into 
cash. Another term which captures the flavor of these assets but 
which has a bankruptcy ring might be "executory opportunities," or, 
to use other jargon, "relational assets."96 They share the characteris-
96. For discussion of the concept of how relationships can become assets, see, e.g., I. MAC· 
NEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CoNTRAcr (1980); Goetz & Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 
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tic that, from the vultures' standpoint, conversion from one form to 
another can be done ollly by Victim cooperation. They might also be 
called Victim-specific assets. Since their value is difficult to capitalize, 
they cannot· be easily traded in markets. 
A more accurate picture would show all the boxes as contiguous or 
overlapping, with only very fuzzy lines distinguishing them. I drew 
them with spaces in between for the various arrows, labeled in brack-
ets, to show that the Victim can move his wealth from one box to 
another. I added some cryptic indications of ways in which the moves 
can be accomplished. Thus I show that the Victim can turn illiquid 
and co-owned property into cash in several ways. He can use them 
productively to earn cash. (I have in mind clipping coupons, or em-
ployment of a depreciating machine without making provisions to re-
pair or replace it.) Those examples illustrate that the liquidate-by-use 
technique may take considerable time before much cash is accumu-
lated. Portfolio adjustments which take that form use markets, but 
only indirectly or as part of a more complex hybrid market/ 
nonmarket conversion process. The Victim can also engage in a vari-
ety of more direct market transactions with his property assets, like 
renting, mortgaging, or selling them. He can turn potential property 
into cash by dint of future work or investment, employment of his 
skills and experience, completing his plans, using his information, or 
crawling to his in-laws. 
The existence of inedible assets in our loss minimization model is 
important for two reasons. First, debtors will seek to maximize the 
values of the inedible assets in their portfolios just as they do for their 
edible assets. Second, wealth can be transferred from one of those 
forms to the other, which means that Victims can adjust their portfo-
lios by investing in or liquidating inedible assets. 
The desire to hold some cheap-to-convert assets like cash can now 
be explained, even for a Victim in dire distress. Edible assets may be 
necessary to finance the adjustments which are continually required to 
maximize the value of his portfolio of inedible assets. It may take cash 
to retain the love of a good mate, to realize on the goodwill generated 
by an advertising campaign, or to obtain paybacks from investments in 
specialized training for employees. It follows that Victims have an 
interest in maximizing the values in their edible portfolios so long as 
and to the extent that edible assets are required to finance adjustments 
desired because of price, taste, technological, and wealth shocks to the 
67 VA. L. REv. 1089 (1981); Linzer, Uncontracts: Context, Contorts and the Relational Ap-
proach, 1988 ANN. SURV. OF AM. L. 139 (1989). 
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equilibrium in their inedible asset portfolios. That is simply one more 
reason to doubt that Victims will ever be completely passive. 
By the same token, if some inedible assets are convertible into gold 
that will satisfy vultures more cheaply than some edible assets can be 
similarly converted, Victims have incentives to make such conver-
sions. The existence of high surplus values and high conversion costs 
for edible assets remaining in a portfolio gives vultures leverage to in-
fluence Victims to cooperate in making their inedible assets available 
to fund future vulture feasts as well. A threat to seize your family 
Bible if you do not seek a loan from your mother illustrates that 
leverage. 
2. The External Effects of lnedibility 
The existence of inedible assets in the Victim's portfolio at the 
point of extreme failure adds an additional twist to his incentives. As 
the probability of vulture seizures increases, the costs of protective 
measures rise, or the efficacy of those available declines, the values of 
the edible assets in Victim's portfolio become increasingly steeply dis-
counted. 97 Since inedible assets cannot be grabbed, their values are 
not discounted so steeply. At some point the worth to the Victim of 
his least valued edible asset will thus drop below the value he places on 
obtaining an additional inedible asset. He will therefore convert that 
edible into the more highly desired inedible item. From the standpoint 
of Victims facing the risks of holding edible assets, the conversion is 
wealth maximizing. As long as it remains possible to hold inedible 
assets, Victims have the incentive to make conversions until their es-
tates no longer contain any edible assets. Consequently, empty edible 
estates may not evidence passivity, but rather may result from wealth 
maximization incentives in a world in which it is possible to hold as-
sets in an inedible form and costly to hold them in edible form. 
Such conversions may be suboptimal. While there have always 
been conflicts of interest between Victims and vultures, as long as Vic-
tims retained assets vultures got fed; either they were likely to feed 
themselves in the manner least harmful to Victims, or the Victims 
were likely to be able to minimize the cost of adverse vulture menu 
selections. Thus, given the Murphian inevitability that losses would 
occur, we could nevertheless conclude that optimal resource allocation 
97. See discussion in the text accompanying supra notes 77 and 78 showing that the loss of 
one asset also destroys the surplus in the next-to-the-least-valued asset. The loss of edible assets 
similarly reduces the rent values held in inedible assets if they are the next in line. In addition, 
since the value of an asset is simply the discounted value of its future services, the prospect of a 
shortened service life tends to diminish present value. 
June 1990] Bankruptcy Theory 2137 
obtained. Either Victims were indifferent to the manner in which vul-
tures raided, or vultures were indifferent to the manner in which Vic-
tims responded, leaving losses minimized. 
The vultures are not indifferent to the Victim's decision to convert 
edibles into inedibles.98 It is thus impossible to conclude that such last 
steps of the economically dying Victim are optimal. Such conversions 
tend to maximize the Victim's wealth in the face of a world full of risk, 
but they tend at the same time to reduce the welfare of vultures. The 
conversions should then be hailed or regretted depending on whether 
the gains to the Victims outweigh the losses to the vultures. 
If the world were perfect enough, the behavior of the affected Vic-
tims and vultures would permit us to know whether the conversions 
were worthwhile. If the losses to vultures were larger than the gains to 
Victims, and the costs of transactions were zero, vultures jointly 
would pay victims not to make the conversions. The fact that no of-
fers to pay are made to any Victim thus would be evidence that the 
benefits to Victims exceeded the losses to vultures. 
In the Murphian world we have posited, the absence of such offers 
is less comforting evidence. The costs of making such bargains, in-
cluding the costs of organizing a joint enterprise among vultures, 
rather than the absence of possible gains in aggregate welfare may ex-
plain why no vulture offers are forthcoming. Vultures who cannot en-
force any such deals they might make (at least until creditors' 
remedies are invented) either with each other or with Victims, may not 
attempt to initiate the deals in the first place. 
On the other hand, the costs to the vultures simply represent the 
loss of benefits they formerly gained when Victims held edible assets. 
The vultures never paid for those benefits in the first place. The bene-
fits they lose, therefore, are "external." Since they do not obtain simi-
lar ·benefits when Victims decide to hold wealth in an inedible form, 
they are forced to pay if they desire to maintain the' preexisting benefit 
levels. Indeed, one reason a Victim might convert edibles into in-
edibles may be to exclude vultures from obtaining those unpaid-for 
benefits in order to induce the vultures to pay. 
Forcing vultures to pay for the benefits they receive tends to opti-
mize aggregate welfare. If those who provide benefits to others do not 
98. We have noted some other instances in which the Victim's actions to maximize his 
wealth may reduce the welfare of vultures. See, e.g., supra note 87. To the extent that Victims 
spend resources which reduce the likelihood of all vulture seizures by, for example, raising all 
seizure costs, rather than simply influencing the order in which vultures are likely to choose to 
seize assets, a similar conflict between Victim and vulture welfare exists as well. The arguments 
made below concerning the conflicts created by the existence of inedible assets apply to these 
other cases as well. 
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get paid for them, they are likely to engage in too little of the activity 
that provides those benefits. It may be costly for vultures to organize 
themselves to make such payments. Nevertheless, it cannot be con-
cluded that conversions should be prevented in principle. The aggre-
gate welfare lost by eliminating the power of Victims to induce 
payments from vultures would have to be weighed against the net 
losses suffered by reason of the vultures' inability to cooperate. The 
above conclusions are formally expounded in the appendix to this pa-
per, for readers familiar with standard economic geometry. The un-
certainty about whether welfare can easily be optimized in a Murphian 
world of transaction costs and inedible assets demonstrated here and 
in the appendix, however, need not remain with us any longer than it 
takes to invent nonbankruptcy creditors' remedies. 
G. Loss Minimization in a World with Creditors 
It has already been suggested that the existence of credit markets 
permits a debtor to overcome some of the problems associated with 
the indivisibility of assets, and thus to liquidate more efficiently and 
adjust her inventory when losses occur. Once we adopt laws giving 
remedies to creditors, we can drop the last of our idealistic, non-Mur-
phian world assumptions and presume that instead of facing the risk 
of asset seizures by vultures, the Victim faces creditors holding collec-
tion writs instead. It should be obvious from the assumption that vul-
tures are rational that changing the identity of potential asset grabbers 
from vultures into creditors does not change the analysis. Scavengers 
are scavengers. Seizing creditors are likely to behave just as rational 
vultures do, and Victims are likely to react to actual and impending 
creditor seizures in the same way as they would to grabs made or 
threatened by vultures. 
Creditors differ from vultures in only three important respects, 
none of which undercuts the conclusion that Victims are likely to be 
the optimal liquidators of their own declining affairs. While Victims 
may have been able to bargain with vultures about which assets should 
be seized and when, Victims could not ensure that any negotiating 
vulture could be legally bound not to raid. On the other hand, when 
the seizure threat comes from a creditor, the creditor's entitlement to 
seize is limited. He can collect no more than he is owed. What is 
more, the seizure by any creditor can be prevented by simply paying 
the debt or judgment. In an environment filled with creditors rather 
than vultures, therefore, victims can take certain protective measures 
with the assurance of avoiding seizures. The better ability to plan for 
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dealing with creditors as opposed to vultures makes debtors more 
rather than less efficient as liquidators. 
The second principal difference between the threat of asset loss via 
vulture and creditor raids comes in their timing. Just when creditors 
are likely to seize assets can be anticipated by debtors. Debts typically 
have known maturity dates. Of course, some debts can be incurred or 
accelerated based on an event of default whose time of occurrence is 
unpredictable. Even for those, however, the procedures which credi-
tors must follow in order to obtain their collection writs take predict-
able amounts of time. Debtors who can anticipate the timing of the 
taking are likely to be more effective liquidators than debtors who 
must plan on being raided at random. 
The third difference between vultures and creditors is the market 
in which seized assets are converted by the taker. A collection writ 
typically gives the debtor a pro rata release from the debt when the 
asset seized is cash, whether taken from a money bag or collected from 
a garnishee. All other assets, however, typically are required to be 
liquidated at auction sales held in courthouses. 99 The relative infre-
quency with which courthouse auctions are used by commercial sellers 
is powerful evidence that the auction market is not an efficient tech-
nique for turning assets into cash. Debtors likely have access to liqui-
dation markets which are far superior to those available to seizing 
creditors (at least for the first "sale"). Even were sheriff's sales not the 
mandated means by which creditors liquidate assets, it seems reason-
able to believe that as between debtors who chose to invest in and own 
the particular assets seized, and creditors who merely finance them, 
that debtors as a class likely have more information about conversion 
markets, and lower costs in searching for buyers than creditors as a 
class. Debtors would thus be better liquidators simply because of their 
familiarity with the assets: 
In short, the differences between vultures and creditors tend to 
make debtors even better salvagers of their own misfortunes than they 
would be in a world where the risk of loss came from vultures rather 
than creditors. We have l(oted, however, one caveat concerning the 
wisdom of a regime which permits debtors to liquidate themselves: 
What of the instances in which the natural incentives for Victims to 
adjust portfolios, protect their assets, or convert them into inedible 
99. See D. EPSTEIN & J. LANDERS, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: CASES AND MATERIALS 72 
(2d ed. 1982). Note that while sheriffs' sales are usually required by the terms of most nonban-
kruptcy collection statutes, the requirement is not inevitable. It is at least conceivable that credi-
tors' remedies could require creditors and sheriffs to resort to a more appropriate market. Cf. 
u.c.c. § 9-504(3) (1972). 
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form tend to reduce the welfare of creµitors? At minimum, the exist-
ence of such potential conflicts means that debtor welfare is not 
strictly derivative of creditor welfare. What's good for creditors is not 
always good for debtors. Such conflicts can be efficiently resolved only 
consensually between debtors and their creditors. 
Is it possible that the inability of creditors to act jointly in con-
tracting around the potential conflicts of interest between themselves 
collectively and the debtor nevertheless justifies adopting bankruptcy 
law? Probably not. Creditors can act individually, at the time they 
extend credit, and thus resolve those potential welfare conflicts with 
their debtors. 
The status of creditor most often arises from consensual relation-
ships.100 The fact that such relationships exist gives good indication 
that the costs of transacting between the relating parties are relatively 
low. The problems created by potential conflicts of interest can be 
anticipated and provided for in the credit contracts actually formed 
between debtors and creditors. If the expected value to debtors of re-
taining the right to control the conversion of their assets is high, they 
can be expected to bargain for the right to retain that control, and will 
expect to pay their creditors for that right. 
On the other hand, if there are assets which debtors think they are 
likely not to want to convert (or if creditors are likely to be superior 
liquidators of certain assets) and the value to some creditors of the 
power to prevent conversions is high, debtors can be expected to grant 
security interests to creditors in those assets. Creditors can expect to 
pay for the right to veto debtors' proposals to transact with specific 
assets by taking lower interest rates or by granting other favorable 
terms in the contract providing for the secured transaction. 
In summary, in a world with creditors having legal remedies, debt-
ors are likely to retain the right to liquidate when it is efficient for 
them to do so, and to convey that right to individual creditors when it 
is not. Given the power to liquidate and distribute a portion of their 
estate, they are not likely to remain passive in the face of losses but 
instead are likely to exercise the power they bargained for. Left in 
their bankruptcy estates will be the encumbered assets which they had 
no power to liquidate and distribute, but those assets will benefit the 
secured parties and not the general creditors. So long as debtors are 
the superior liquidators of certain assets in their own estates they will 
liquidate those assets themselves rather than turn the task over to a 
100. Like other writers before me, see, e.g., Jackson & Scott, supra note 18, at 177-78, I 
ignore the substantial difficulties involved in resolving potential conflicts of interest by contract 
for creditors like tort victims and tax collectors, whose claims arise nonconsensually. 
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process which is less efficient. Since bankruptcy law is unlikely to af-
fect the superior liquidating abilities of debtors, except in the occa-
sional accidental case, it is never likely to produce anything but empty 
bankruptcy estates. 
IV. THE MORAL OF THE MURPHIAN MAf\fDATE: BANKRUPTCY IS 
SUBJECT TO MURPHY'S LAW 
The purpose of this study has been to demonstrate that we lack 
any persuasive theory for why we have or ought to have bankruptcy 
legislation. Legal explanations for bankruptcy policy are simply unex-
planatory. The only systematic attempts to justify banlcruptcy law 
which go beneath the conclusory legal explanations are also uncon-
vincing. They implicitly ignore the possibility that debtors will react 
to losses. They predict that creditors will make recoveries in bank-
ruptcies when we can easily observe that creditors do not. 
The reason why bankruptcy estates will be empty, and why the 
"Creditors' Bargain" theorists were mistaken, is basically the same. 
Debtors, as we have demonstrated, will react to threats of loss so long 
as they have any power and opportunity to do so.101 The theory devel-
oped here explains just how they can be expected to react. That, in 
tum, explains the ways in which the character of debtors' portfolios 
changes as losses continue, and, eventually, why debtors' estates are 
likely to be valueless to creditors by the time bankruptcy occurs. 
The source of debtors' powers to react resides in the property 
rights they have in their assets. So long as we permit private property, 
which includes entitling property owners to transact with their prop-
erty, the power exists for them to react to the threat of losses in the 
ways described above. The theory developed in this study demon-
strates the utility of permitting such transactions: debtors will use that 
entitlement either to minimize the impact of losses, without harming 
their creditors, or to pay creditors in advance for any harm creditors 
may suffer by the exercise of that power. In that sense, the private 
property system tends to induce optimal ioss minimization in a world 
which contains risks that losses might occur. It also follows that if we 
wish to change the behavior of debtors in ways which better ensure 
101. We do not, for example, consider our private property to be a common pool when 
looked at from the standpoint of the thieves who may take it from us. We have the ability to 
react to threatened thievery. The possible actions available to debtors to react to threats by 
creditors may be more limited than the set of entitlements owners have to react to threatening 
thieves. By the same token, however, the legal strategies available to creditors pursuing their 
claims are more limited than the strategies which thieves, who are less affected by legal trifles, 
may consider and adopt. The point is the same, however. If there is an owner of the assets who 
can react, there is no common pool problem. 
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that creditors will always get paid in full in bankruptcies, tinkering 
with the bankruptcy act itself is likely to be unproductive. What 
would be required to achieve such an ideal is, instead, a drastic con-
striction of the number and scope of the rights which we grant owners 
under our law of property. 
Even when permitting debtors to self-liquidate generates welfare 
conflicts between debtors and creditors, there is no theoretical point at 
which we can say overall welfare would be enhanced by making a 
change to collective control. Because those welfare conflicts poten-
tially exist, a bargain theory which justifies bankruptcy law must posit 
a bargain to which the debtor is a party. Real debtors, however, are 
parties to real credit contracts with real creditors. If there are poten-
tial welfare conflicts between debtors and creditors, there i~ no reason 
to believe that the existing credit contracts do not resolve them. Cred-
itors might agree to take the risk that the debtor will liquidate her own 
property and adjust the price of credit accordingly, or they may elimi-
nate the debtor's ability to control her affairs by taking real rights in 
the debtor's assets and thus prohibit the debtor from transacting in 
those assets. In short, there are good theoretical reasons, grounded in 
conventional economic assumptions, for believing that debtors are apt 
to be efficient liquidators when they are facing failure. Their creditors 
have been paid for the risk that losses will result from the contract 
term that permits debtors to liquidate their unencumbered assets, and 
debtors, in turn, have taken the risk that their encumbered assets will 
be unavailable for use in making portfolio adjustments when losses 
occur. 
Indeed, the efficiency of permitting the debtor to control the liqui-
dation of her own affairs even explains the shape of the common credi-
tor's remedy, which permits the debtor to foresee the time at which 
seizure may occur and to employ any of her assets to satisfy or refi-
nance maturing obligations. The secured transaction, which limits the 
ability of the debtor to deal with the assets which collateralize the debt 
without first paying off or obtaining consent of the creditor, is the unu-
sual credit term. Debtors usually want as much discretion as possible 
in dealing with their assets and are presumably willing to pay many of 
their creditors to give them that discretion. That is the import of be-
ing unsecured. So long as Victims will bargain for the right to liqui-
date themselves and our law of property permits them to make such 
bargains, it is likely that empty bankruptcy estates will always be a 
feature of bankruptcy. No amount of tinkering is likely to change that 
fact. 
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A. Whither Murphian Economic Theory: An Introduction to 
Murphian Bankruptcy Distributions 
The proponents of pro rata bankruptcy distribution erred by mis-
takenly assuming that debtors will fail to maximize the value of their 
portfolios so that a collective system is necess_ary to maximize it for 
them and their creditors. Their analysis goes astray for another simple 
reason: it is focussed on optimizing the wrong variable. The "com-
mon-pool" analysis is premised on the unspoken assumption that if 
the market value of the debtor's estate is maximized everything will be 
hunky dory. Efficient bankruptcy policy would seek not to maximize 
the value of debtors' estates, but rather to minimize bankruptcy 
losses. 102 
Those two quanta differ in three essential respects. The manner of 
distribution itself influences the size of the loss. First, debtors must 
experience some gains by choosing to distribute on a non-pro rata ba-
sis. Otherwise, there would be no need for bankruptcy law to force a 
change in that natural behavior. The pro rata requirement eliminates 
those gains, increasing the value of the bankruptcy losses borne by 
debtors, even those who maximize the aggregate market value of their 
distributions. Second, if losses are to be minimized, not only must the 
value of what is distributed be maximized but also the distribution of 
the assets must be made first to those who value getting paid the most 
and last to those who value avoiding losses the least. Third, the costs 
of making the distribution must also be minimized. A pro rata 
formula will achieve the first two goals only in a highly unlikely world 
in which all creditors are clones103 so that the value the debtor places 
on satisfying each, and the value each places on losses, are identical. 
By the same token, except in a freak world where all creditors are 
equally efficient collectors, a pro rata distribution scheme will negate 
the social benefits which result from a system that rewards most those 
creditors who are capable of effecting low-cost transfers of the debtor's 
assets to themselves. In a real Murphian world, of course, real debtors 
do have preferences, and real creditors differ in the values they place 
on losses and in their relative skills of effecting low-cost transfers. 
A complete Murphian theory would show that non-pro rata distri-
butions of debtors' assets that occur in the real Murphian world tend 
102. It should be obvious by now that focussing on asset value maximization instead of loss 
minimization is a classic blind spot typical of those who are unfamiliar with Murphian 
philosophy. 
103. Note that some writers in the classical tradition which existed before the introduction of 
Critical Murphian Studies do make this assumption. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 14, at 7 (discuss-
ing the homogeneity of creditors). 
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to approach the loss minimizing ideal. There are certainly impression-
istic reasons for believing that permitting debtors to control the distri-
bution of their assets would tend toward the optimal. In the 
vernacular of the initial parable, Victims are apt to feed their favorite 
vulture first. The hungriest vultures are, ceteris paribus, likely to ex-
pend greater efforts in staging raids on the Victim's assets, the satiated 
ones less so. In a like manner, vultures whose costs of raiding are 
lowest will get more to eat from a given Victim's assets than those who 
are less efficient raiders, so that the costs of transfers from Victims to 
vultures are also likely to be minimized. A complete proof that debt-
ors are likely to be the most efficient distributors as well as the most 
efficient liquidators of their own estates is beyond the scope of this 
study. It is obvious, however, that pro rata distribution of the sort 
envisioned by classic bankruptcy law would achieve none of those dis-
tributional gains. That may further explain why actual distributions 
occur outside of bankruptcy leaving nothing to be qistributed when 
the proceedings occur. If there were anything left to be distributed 
pro rata, the world would be worse off if it were done under the classic 
pro rata scheme. 
Among other problems that such a showing would have to solve is 
what Alan Schwartz has called "The Continuing Puzzle of Secured 
Debt."104 Why a debtor's distributional decisions made at the time of 
the initial extension of credit are likely to be efficient is something that 
we currently do not well understand. Work is already underway in 
the Murphian Community on those problems, however. The Mur-
phian Asset Management Theory has already revealed that debtors 
have significant preferences for the order in which creditors can seize 
assets. That leads naturally to a theory of secured debt as an efficient 
means for debtors to influence the risk that assets will be seized in 
suboptimal sequences. Once Critical Murphian Theory becomes a rec-
ognized discipline, the intellectual obstacles standing in the way of a 
rigorous showing that the debtor is not only the most efficient liquida-
tor but also the most efficient distributor of his assets will surely be 
overcome. When that work is complete, any remaining doubt that 
classic bankruptcy law (as we have initially defined it) can be justified 
on economic grounds should be eliminated. The possibility remains, 
despite suggestions to the contrary, 105 that another sort of bankruptcy 
regime, one in which debtors do have the power to make the liquida-
tion and distribution decisions, could replace the classic version which 
104. Schwartz, The Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1051 (1984). 
105. See, e.g., T. JACKSON, supra note 18, at 209-24; Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate 
Reorganizations, 15 J. LEGAL STUD. 127 (1985). 
June 1990] Bankruptcy Theory 2145 
we have considered here. Optimists might see the current reorganiza-
tion chapters of the Bankruptcy Code, which do give limited effect to 
the desires of debtors on the questions of what will become of their 
assets, and who will share in them, as the first hesitant steps along the 
path to develop an optimal creditors' remedy system to deal with fi-
nancial disasters. 
B. Principles of Murphian Politics - An Afterword 
Murphian theory proves that collective control over the liquida-
tion and distribution of debtors' assets is unnecessary if we are inter-
ested in optimal liquidations. The question remains: Why then .do we 
have bankruptcy law? Why do we wish to entrust liquidation and dis-
tribution decisions to those who will make them in ways which harm 
rather than enhance aggregate welfare? The interests of those who get 
to make the decisions (the butchers and their helpers) are of course 
clear enough, but why would those they are supposed to serve (who 
generally get nothing from the services being provided) ever agree to 
hire them? Not surprisingly, Murphian theory has an answer to those 
questions as well. 
The impulse to have bankruptcy law and to tinker with it after we 
have it comes not from notions of "equality" or "efficiency" but rather 
from wishful thinking. We are doomed because we harbor hope, a 
specific belief in alchemy: that if we are only clever enough, gold can 
be squeezed from turnips. Our fatal wish is for a world in which disas-
ters don't occur. We don't really care if anybody gets paid "equally" 
or paid "efficiently." What we really want is a world in which they get 
paid. Period. 
Our commitment to the proposition that everybody should get 
paid grows from our belief that their claims are worthy. We are of-
fended if promises upon which we rely aren't performed, if injuries go 
uncompensated. At least since the abolition of debtors' prisons, how-
ever, we have also adopted a regime in which our commitment to en-
force worthy claims is limited to extractions of money. Laws which 
enforce contract, tort, and property obligations are effective only 
against those who have monetizable wealth. The poor are free to com-
mit their torts, breach their contracts, ignore their duties. Among 
those poor are our bankrupts. 
When someone doesn't get paid, we are forced to confront just 
how weak the law really is. That gives rise to the illusion that if only 
the law were stronger, our basic values could be vindicated. The law 
grows from essentially political roots, and we have much faith in poli-
tics, both electoral and judicial. In particular, bankruptcy is the crea-
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tion of Congresses and Parliaments. Members of Parliament and of 
Congress are likely to respond to the pleas of their constituents who do 
not get paid. 106 Those who do get paid are unlikely to take much 
interest in bankruptcy legislation. It is thus easy to understand why 
such legislation exists.101 Even the complaining unpaid constituents, 
however, may be unwilling to agree to wholesale reductions in the 
rights they possess to transact in their own property. It follows that 
the legislation they demand is likely to leave their own basic property 
rights intact, and, consequently, is unlikely ever to gain for them what 
they desire. 
Bankruptcy law is a symbol of our faith that wealth can be created 
by voting, lobbying, and litigating. We sometimes overlook the Mur-
phian possibility that wealth can also be destroyed by the same means. 
What is hardest to accept, however, is that sometimes law is likely 
neither to create nor to destroy much wealth. The core insight of 
Murphy's Law is not that the world is necessarily an inevitably un-
happy place. Murphy's point was actually both more potent and more 
subtle. Expending the effort required to make the world happier tends 
to make us unhappier. We can credit ourselves with the happiness 
that results from honest effort in trying to improve the world by tink-
ering with bankruptcy law and, fortunately, we can't do much dam-
age. Until we are ready to abandon the institution of private property, 
however, we won't accomplish much either. 
106. There is some evidence, for example, that bankruptcy legislation in this country resulted 
from the fears of distant creditors that most recoveries from bankrupt debtors would be made by 
creditors who lived nearby (and, presumably for that reason, were more efficient collectors). See 
Weisberg, supra note 12. 
107. The Johnsen Judgment referred to in supra note 9 elaborates on this explanation. 
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APPENDIX 
Graph One below illustrates the position of the vultures as bearers 
of the external costs of Victim's activities as Victims choose to convert 
their edible assets into inedible form. Because the welfare conflicts 
illustrated here occur whether or not the assets involved are divisible 
or indivisible, the functions shown are drawn in the customary form 
which assumes divisibility. (Stairstep shaped curves which describe 
the demand for lumpy assets yield similar, if less discrete, results.) 
Curves DDJ, DD2, and DD3 represent the Victim's demands at 
three times for any edible good, say, Gadgets. As his assets are eaten, 
his ability to pay and therefore the rents in his existing inventory of 
Gadgets decline, a feature illustrated by the downward shifts in his 
demand over the course of two vulture raids. Because in a world in 
which assets are not perfectly divisible the remaining wealth tends to 
be more highly concentrated in specialized or idiosyncratically valued 
goods and some demand for Gadgets remains, we suppose that Gad-
gets are specialized or uniquely valued. The downward shifts are also 
accompanied by a steepening effect to illustrate that the demand for 
whatever remains tends to become increasingly inelastic.108 
Curve CD represents the marginal opportunity cost to the Victim 
of holding Gadgets, which is itself a function of two determinates: 
how much he values the other assets in his inventory which he would 
have to give up in order to acquire more Gadgets, and the costs of 
converting those other assets into Gadgets should he ever decide to do 
so. If the market conversion costs remain' relatively constant but, as 
his total wealth declines his demand for his remaining assets declines 
along with it, his cost of holding Gadgets also increases; thus CD is 
shown having a positive slope, depicting lower costs of holding Gad-
gets at lower levels of wealth. 
DC shows the amount vultures would be willing to pay to ensure 
that Victim kept varying stocks of edible assets for them to snack on, 
108. Elasticity is simply a measure of responsiveness of demand. It measures how much the 
amount demanded will change if the price changes. When demand is elastic, small price changes 
have big effects on the quantity demanded. When it is inelastic, the amount demanded changes 
very little as price fluctuates. The reasons for concluding that the demand of Victims in distress 
for the goods they already hold becomes increasingly inelastic relate to the changing character of 
the victim's portfolio as his wealth declines. The tendency of the assets which remain to be of the 
more specialized or idiosyncratically valued variety noted in the discussion above, see supra text 
following note 79, means satisfactory substitutes for them are less likely to be easily available in 
the market or elsewhere. Demand for goods that have easily available, satisfactory substitutes 
tends to be elastic. Demand for goods that don't tends to be more inelastic. In addition, the 
reduced portfolio is more likely to be highly concentrated with goods regarded by the Victim as 
"necessities." Demand for necessities tends to be more inelastic than demand for luxuries. See, 











measured in terms of Gadgets. At high inventory levels, Victim keeps 
more Gadgets and equivalents than vultures anticipate ever wanting to 
eat - in other words, they can get full on Q2 Gadget-equivalents. At 
inventory levels below Q2, however, they face some prospect of going 
hungry and would be willing to give up something to avoid that pros-
pect. Thus, the total welfare gains experienced by vultures from Vic-
tim's decision to hold Gadgets and other edible assets are represented 
by the area under DC. 109 
109. That vultures can be external beneficiaries of Victims' wealth is a consequence of the 
economic weakness of the Victims' legal entitlements to their assets. Property law gives you a 
right to exclude others from the benefits of your activity. It does not, however, necessarily give 
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Now suppose when the Victim's taste for Gadgets is represented 
by DDI, his Bezzt is taken. The drop in his total wealth reduces his 
desire for Gadgets to the level shown by DD2. The optimal number of 
Gadgets to hold will accordingly drop from QI to Q2. In order to 
recover the welfare loss of now holding more Gadgets and fewer 
Bezzts than he really wants (equal to the area of triangle F) Victim 
will sell off QI - Q2 Gadgets and reinvest the proceeds in a replace-
ment Bezzt. The portfolio adjustment benefits Victim by the value of 
F. (F is how much the Victim would prefer holding a replacement 
Bezzt instead of Ql - Q2 Gadgets.) As long as he continues to hold at 
least Q2 Gadgets and equivalents, however, the vultures are indifferent 
to his decision to liquidate Gadgets. If Gadgets and Bezzts are viewed 
as close substitutes by vultures, they may either be indifferent, or even 
applaud the decision to add another Bezzt. 
When, however, at the reduced DD2 level of wealth, the vultures 
make an additional Bezzt raid, Victim's desire for Gadgets will decline 
still further to DD3. Part of the decline is attributable to the addi-
tional wealth lost. Part may also result from the discounting of value 
of Gadgets resulting from the increasing probability that vultures may 
start to eat them up as well. By now, however, the possibility of raids 
on any other edible assets makes it unattractive to adjust by investing 
in them. The desire to acquire the next most valued inedible asset may 
now exceed the desire to acquire an additional Gadget so that loss 
minimization is possible by converting the now excess Gadgets into 
inedible assets. As a result, Victim will sell off Q2 - Q3 Gadgets, mak-
ing himself better off by the amount of triangle G, which is, in effect, 
the rents gained from owning the new inedible asset. Unlike the after-
math of the first adjustment, however, vultures are no longer indiffer-
ent. They experience no gain from the acquisition of the replacement 
inedible asset, and the drop in Gadget holdings erodes their welfare by 
an amount equal to triangle H. 
Whether in the aggregate. the welfare gains by Victims from portfo-
lio adjustments, which redu,ce their inventories of any edible asset be-
you a cheap way to accomplish that exclusion. If you want a grand piano and you know that it 
will make your mother happy if you have one, the only practical way of excluding her from that 
happiness in order to induce her to pay you for her pleasure is to forgo getting the piano in the 
first place, which means that you must risk the entire rent value of the piano. 
Until credit contracts become enforceable, it is difficult for Victims to obtain agreements from 
vultures to pay for the benefits in any case, although as we shall see later, once vultures become 
creditors the existence of credit markets may result in having those benefits paid for. If credit 
contracts actually exist in which debtors promise creditors to maintain specified levels of net 
worth, or loan-to-value ratios for collateral, there is empirical reason to believe that creditors 
actually pay for such assurances in the real world. The current Bankruptcy Code has no provi-
sions giving priority to creditors who make such payments over those who apparently do not. 
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low the level of Q2, outweigh the losses to vultures depends on the 
likelihood that H < G. That will, in turn, depend on the relative 
shapes of DD3 and DC. Note that as Victim's demand becomes more 
inelastic, the area of G tends to increase, and the same relationship 
exists between the area in H and the inelasticity of DC. To digress for 
a moment, if vultures were well diversified creditors and Victims were 
strapped debtors, there are reasons to believe that any single Victim's 
demand will be less elastic than the aggregate demand of many Vul-
tures, 110 a fact which would justify permitting Victims to do with their 
assets what they want, and place the burden on the vultures to pay the 
appropriate Coasian bribes111 in order to induce maintenance of opti-
mal inventory levels of Gadgets. 
The fact that welfare conflicts potentially exist between vultures 
and Victims means that Victim's interests are not wholly derivative of 
the vultures' welfare. If vultures were creditors, and creditors' reme-
dies were invented, one might anticipate that some creditors would 
pay the bribes by taking security interests. Others, of course, might 
decide not to, in which case they take the risk of remaining unsecured. 
In other words, once the law enforces creditors' claims, there is reason 
to hope that any welfare conflicts which exist between debtors and 
creditors could be resolved in their ex ante credit contracts. 
110. If a drop in price causes me to purchase an additional Bezzt, and the same drop induces 
you to purchase an additional Bezzt, it is easy to see that our aggregate response to the price 
change is greater than the response of either one of us looked at alone. Generally, the greater the 
responsiveness of demand, the more elastic we say it is. That is why aggregate or market demand 
curves are more responsive (elastic) than individual demand curves. 
111. See Coase, supra note 71. 
